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ARBITRARY ARREST- EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
The Queen v. DUGUAY, MURPHY AND SEVIGNY* 
Supreme Court of Canada - January 1989 
The L's saw three youths drinking beer in the neiJdibourhood when they went out. 
When they returned home their house had been broken into and stereo equipment 
had been stolen. The,Y managed to discover the identity of the threesome. On a 
hunch and mere suspicion, police asked the three to sit in the back of their cruiser 
and implied that a lot of time could be saved if they told where the stereo equipment 
was. The youths were cooyerative; they confessed and showed them where the 
equipment was. Fingerpnnts were found on the equi{>ment as well as the place of 
entry, which matched those of the accused. The trial Judge acquitted the accused of 
break, enter and theft. He found that the initial arrest amounted to arbitrary 
detention and excluded all evidence (including the statements) under s. 24(2) of the 
Charter. The Ontario Court of Appeal found no fault with the trial judge's reasoning 
and verdict and did not allow an appeal by the Crown. The Crown then appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Canada. 
The Crown conceded that placing the accused in the police car without having 
reasonable and probable grounds that they had committed an offence had amounted 
to arbitrary detention. However, the Crown argued that the evidence should not 
have been excluded as according to the principles relevant to the exclusionary rule 
established in the Collins case•• by the Supreme Court of Canada, (1987), clearly 
state that a voluntary statement (other than one obtained follo~ of denial right to 
counsel), real evidence like the stereo equipment and the fingerpnnts do not affect 
the fairness of a trial and should not be excluded but in the rarest of cases. When the 
accused were tried and when the Crown's Appeal was heard by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal the judges did not have the benefit of Collins decision which was handed 
down two years later. 
One of the seven justices of the Supreme Court of Canada dissented and strongly 
advocated that the principles established in Collins should be applied. He would 
have allowed the Crown's appeal and have ordered a new trial on the basis that 
despite the arbitrary detent10n the evidence should have been admitted. However, 
the other six justices concurred that the Crown's appeal should be dismissed. In a 
very brief (two paragraphs) reasons for judgment, the Court felt it should not 
interfere and substitute their opinion for that arrived at by the Court of Appeal. 
• 
•• 
Crown's Appeal dismissed 
Acquittals upheld. 
See Volume 21, page 16 for decision by Ontario Court of Appeal in this case . 
R. v. COLJmS - Volume 27, page 1 of this publication. 
Comment: 
2 
The Supreme Court of Canada's majority judgment acknowledge that 
they had the jurisdiction to interfere with the Ontario Courts. The 
Court felt it wasn't their proper function to do so in relation to the mill 
issue before them, whether or not the evidence should have been 
suppressed on account of the arbitrary detention. It is as though the 
Court wanted to let bygones be bygones. The Ontario Courts nad not 
created, announced, or proclaimed any principles of law or a rule of 
law with which they disagreed. In the absence of apparent errors as to 
applicable principles or a finding that is unreasonable, the Court felt it 
to be wrong to substitute its opinion for that of the Court of Appeal. 
The trial judge had been very critical of the police in this case. He had 
said that the violation of the accused's right had been blatant and that 
the community would be shocked if evidence was admitted considering 
the authorities behavior in discovering evidence. He said that short of 
torture, he did not believe there was anything that would shock the 
community more. The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed that the 
infringement of the accused rights had been "blatant; they removed 
some of the stin~ of the trial jud$e's comment. They said the harsh 
words were not Justified. The dissenting judgment by one of the 
justices of the Supreme Court of Canacfa agreed with that statement 
and felt that a new trial should be ordered on the basis that the 
evidence the trial judge suppressed was admissible. 
It is difficult to precisely reflect what the majority of our highest court 
ruled. It said there is no jurisdictional problem but we will not 
interfere as no principle were enunciated or applied with which we 
disagree. In common man's language, the Court either said, "It was 
O.K. at the time the accused were tried and the verdict was in their 
favor, so no grave miscarriage of justice will result," or it meant, 'We 
feel that the Ontario Court were right in law and we have a strict 
exclusionary rule--forget what we said in Collins." Members of the 
judiciary favoring a strict exclusionary rule may find comfort by giving 
this ruling the latter interpretation. However, it seems that the former 
view was mtended. 
3 
EXIRADIDON I.AWS AND THE 
QTIZRN'S RIGHT TO REMAIN IN CANADA 
U.S. v. COTRONI and U.S. v. ZEIN -
Supreme Court of Canada - 20035 & 20036 
Frank Santo Cotroni and Samir El Zein are Canadian citizens who allegedly in 
Canada cons.Pired to possess and distribute heroin in the United States. Alf 
communications with their U.S. accomplices were done from Canada. They were 
arrested on warrants under the Extradition Act to be extradited and to be tried in the 
U.S. 
Under the provisions of the Criminal Code, the accused could be tried for the 
alleged conspiracy in Canada. The question "Vlhy extradite if they can be tried in 
their own country?" received not too much attention. The meaning of section 6 of 
the Charter became the main issue in Cotroni and Zein's attempts to have the 
extradition committals quashed. 
The applicable :portion of s. 6 Charter states that every citizen of Canada has the 
right to remain m Canada. On the surface, the section seems to protect us from 
expulsion, banishment or exile rather than from facing the consequences of crimes 
committed outside of Canada, by means of a process provided for in an Act of 
Parliament and a treaty between two nations. Should the Extradition Act infrin,ge on 
our rights to remain in Canada, the Courts must then determine if the limits of tliat 
right caused by the Act are "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" 
(s. 1 Charter). The Quebec Court of Appeal had quashed the committal orders. 
Consequently, these questions were then put to the Supreme Court of Canada in 
February 1989, and the Court responded m June. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that expulsion and exile were the central thrust 
of as. 6 Charter as well as exclusion from membership in our "national community." 
However, despite extradition not being included in such forms of banishment, it "lies 
at.the outer edges of the core values being protected by ... " section 6 of the Charter. 
The Extradition laws consequently infringe the right to remain in Canada. This 
being so, would oblige the Court to decla.fe those parts of the Extradition laws that 
are inconsistent with the Charter to be without force or effect unless they are 
justified under s. 1 of the Charter. 
Said the Court: 
"The investigation, prosecution and suppression of crime for the 
protection of the citizen and the maintenance of peace and public 
order is an important goal of all organized societies. The pursuit of 
that goal cannot realistically be confined within national boundaries. 
The objectives of extradition ~o beyond that of suppressing crime, 
simpliciter, and include bringmg fugitives to justice for the proper 
determination of their guilt or innocence in a proper hearing." 
Conseguently, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the objectives of the 
Extradition Act are "sufficiently important" to make the limits its provisions place on 
the Canadian citizen's right to remain in Canada, reasonable in our free and 
democratic society. 
4 
In respect to the fact that the Canadian Courts have jurisdiction to try the 
respondents for ve-ry acts that caused the U.S. authorities' interest to prosecute, the 
Court said: 
~= 
11It is often better that a crime be prosecuted where its harmful impact 
is felt and where the witnesses ana the persons most interested in 
bringing the criminal to justice reside." 
Committal for surrender was 
restored. 
Two of the seven justices of the Supreme Court of Canada dissented. 
They felt that the provisions of the Extradition Act do violate the 
Charter unjustifiably where the Canadian citizen can be brought to justice in Canada for the ve-ry alleged wron~doing for which another 
nation wants to prosecute him. The dissenting ju<lgement strongly 
advocated that Extradition laws are justified only where the rights of 
the citizen are impaired "as little as :possible.11 The majority judgment 
simply gave the authorities a discretion to proceed by two alternative 
means. Compliance with the Charter was possible in these cases, and 
discretion should not be granted in such circumstances. 
" ... discretion is limited bf the Charter and not visa versa," reasoned 
these justices. A prosecution in Canada could have avoided any 
Charter violations and hence they would have quashed the committals 
for surrender. 
• • • • • 
5 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN FIREARM PROIDBIDON 
HEARING UNDER 'lllE CRIMINAL COPE 
The Queen v. ZEOLKOWSKI - Supreme Court of Canada - May 1989 
Mrs. Z. went to the police and told how her husband had threatened to harm her 
with the firearms he possessed. This resulted in a "hearing" (not a trial) to determine 
if an order should issue 1.1rohibiting Mr. Z from possessing any firearms or 
explosives. The ProvinCial Court Judge ruled that the rules of evidence for the 
hearing were the same as those in a criminal trial and he would not allow the police 
officer who took the co:IJ.laint from Mrs. Z. to testify what she told him while the 
Crown did not want to Mrs. Z. Consequently, the application for the prohibition 
order was dismissed. 
This matter ended up in the Supreme Court of Canada, which acknowledged that the 
nature of the hearing created by means of the Criminal Code is not clear and has 
been the basis for debate and much division on the issue (whether hearsay evidence 
is admissible.) The provision is unique in that it is not comparable to other 
legislative provisions for ''hearings." All the enactment states is that the evidence 
must be relevant Needless to say, Mrs. Z's complaint was very relevant to the issue 
to be decided, that is that "the Provincial Court Judge must be satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that it is not desirable in the interest of the safety of 
the person or of others that the subject of the prohibition application should possess 
a firearm." In other words, the Provincial Court Judge must confirm the reasonable 
and probable grounds which led the applicant (the police officer) to launch the 
application. These grounds need to be proved, not beyond a reasonable doubt, but 
on a balance of probabilities and it was not intended that the hearing be conducted 
as a criminal trial. Hence, relevant hearsay evidence is admiSsible. 
• • • • • 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
Matter referred back to 
Provincial Court to conduct 
the hearing. 
6 
IS TIIE STATEMENT OF A "FENCE" TIIAT GOODS ARE 'HOT' 
SUFFICIENT IO PROVE THEY WERE IN FACT SIOI .EN? 
STRUB v. The Queen - The Supreme Court of Canada 
20317 -June 1989. 
An undercover policeman approached Mr. Strue re the purchase of four wheels and 
tires. In a bargaining conversation with Strue, it becomes abundantly clear that he 
knows the goods are stolen and that he knows the person who "ripped them off." At 
first, they cannot agree on the price the officer asked to be introduced to the "friend" 
who stole the tires so he can bargain with him directly. However, without the 
friend's involvement the officer and Strue agree on a price and the purchase was 
completed. Consequently, Strue is convicted of possession of stolen property. He 
appealed and the legal arguments surrounding the evidence reached the Supreme 
Court of Canada. 
The admissibility of the conversation between the officer and Strue was in issue as 
was the fact that the Crown failed to prove that the wheels and tires were stolen. 
Each indicia in this case that the goods were stolen and that Strue knew it, would by 
itself not be enough to prove the theft. The trial judge admitted the conversation in 
evidence and althouJth agreeing with the defence position, held that the 
circumstances cried ?or an explanation. As he did not get one, he drew an irresistible 
inference from the circumstantial evidence. A split Ontario Court of Appeal agreed 
with the trial judge. 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that without the statement by Strue included in 
his conversation with the officer, there is not enouJt}l evidence to convict him. 
Therefore, the admissibility and the evidentiary value of the conversation is the 
"central issue" in this case. In other words, Strue's behavior (not wanting to be seen 
with the goods) and the act that he sold the items for 10% of their actual value, were 
not capable of amounting to evidence that would meet the burden of proof on the 
Crown. The Court reiterated that for a conviction of possession of stolen property, 
the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the goods were stolen and 
that the accused knew it. The theft can either be proved by direct evidence from the 
owner or it can be shown by circumstantial evidence. (Evidence consistent with guilt 
and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion a reasonable person may 
arrive at.) The Court quoting from a previous decision on these points, said:* 
* 
" ... There is no onus upon an accused to prove that he came 
into possession of the goods honestly. He does not have to 
account for his possession. Refusal or failure to give a 
satisfactory explanation as to the manner in which he acquired 
the goods, or even conflicting explanations, do no afford proof 
that the good were stolen." 
R. v. VOGELLE and REID (1969) 9 C.R.N.S. 101. 
(Please note that in regard to the explanation "recent possession" was not raised or in 
issue. See Volume 33, page 15. KOWLYK v. The Queen). 
7 
In the case from which the Court quoted, the two accused had made inculpatory 
statements to say that the goods were "hot." Nonetheless, that failed to prove the 
requisite theft. 
"The statements given to the police ... fell short of proving that 
the goods were stolen. A finding of guilt must rest firmly upon 
fact or inference ... " 
In England, a man bou~t a£ 280. T.V. set from a complete stranger for£ 90. The 
transaction took place ma betting shop. The purchaser admitted to know the actual 
value of the set and did consequently believe the set to have been stolen. That was 
in 1980, to have been sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer the T.V. had 
been stolen and knowledge of that fact on the part of the accused. In other similar 
cases, the Courts have held that admission of a form of willful blindness to a bargain 
which leaves one to infer that the item is stolen, is merely hearsay evidence in 
relation to proving that the item had been stolen. After all, the suspect cannot vouch 
for the truth of what he has inferred from the bargain. However, them is a clear 
distinction between a confession to know for a fact that the goods were stolen and an 
admission to have drawn an inference from a bargain that the goods were obtained 
by theft. In relation to the latter, a man who bought $1300.00worth of materials in a 
bar from a person unknown, for a measly $150.00 cash, and admitted to have 
realized that the goods were "hot," could not be convicted for lack of proof that the 
goods were actually stolen.*"' 
In this case, Mr. Strue's friend told him he had "ripped off' the tires and wheels from 
a Volkswagon. Mr. Strue obviously had accepted that hearsay statement as being 
true. He did not simply report or admit to being the recipient of his friend's 
statement, (leaving in the middle whether he believed it to be true) but adopted it as 
the truth and believed it completely. The Supreme Court of Canada held 
unanimously that there was no reason to treat such an admission any differently as 
direct testimony by the accused person himself. The weight such evidence receives 
is, of course, up to the trier of facts .. 
Quoting from a case decided nearly 130 years ago, the Supreme Court adopted the 
following statement as their own: 
Are no admissions good against a party, unless founded on his 
personal knowledge? The admiss10ns would not be made except on 
evidence which satisfies the party who is making them against his own 
interest, that they are true, and that is evidence to the jury that they 
are true." 
The Supreme Court of Canada concluded that Strue did a lot more than reporting a 
hearsay statement. He relied on that statement to be true and acted upon it. The 
statement was admissible to be weighed in terms of proof. 
R. v. BLLI01T(1984) 15 C.C.C. (3d) 195. Alberta Court of Appeal. 
8 
In other words, the statement is admissible in evidence and is capable to prove the 
truth of its content (point of law). Whether or not it does prove its content is up to 
the trier of fact (a point of fact) the jury. 
• • • • • 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld 
9 
CAN THERE BE A CONVICTION FOR USING A FIREARM 
WHILE COMMITTING AN INDICTABLE BY ITSELF? 
Regina v. PRINGLE - Supreme Court of Canada 
June 1989 
The criminal code provides that using a firearm in the commission of an indictable 
offence or during flight after committing the offence, constitutes an indictable 
offense whether or not anyone was harmed, or if harm was intended. 
This section has been under attack at several stages of our recent criminaJ law 
evolution. The Courts have held that this offence can be charged in addition to the 
offence durin~ which the firearm was used and that not even in a charge of armed 
robbery, convictions for both offences amounts to double jeopardy . .:. 
In the mid seventies, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that two criminaJ 
convictions arising from one delict was improper.*• A party by the name of 
Kienapple had been convicted of both "rape" (as it then was) and having sexual 
intercourse with an underage girl. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 
offences overlapped and arose from one delict. Sexual intercourse was an essential 
element of both offences and the charges arose from one act of such intercourse. 
la post Charter days (1985), Krug committed armed robbery and was convicted of 
that offence as well as using a firearm in the commission of that offence. Although 
he could have been convicted of armed robbery using a weapon other than a firearm, 
the two convictions still arose from one delict. Using a weapon was an essential 
element of the armed robbery offence. Krug appealed his convictions to the 
Supreme Court of Canada urging that what was good enough for Keinapple was 
good enough for him. However, the Court did not agree. The fact that the weapon 
used to make a theft robbery does not need to be a firearm, caused the offence of 
using a firearm in the commission of an indictable offence separate and distinct from 
armed robbery. The Court reiterated their views on this issue as expressed in pre-
Charter times.•*"' They said that the specific criminal code provision for seIVing a 
prison sentence for this offence consecutively to the term imposed for the indictable 
offence during which the firearm was used, clearly indicated l>arliament's intent that 
the offences were to be separate from one another (also in armed robbery) and were 
clearly designed to deal with the menace of firearms. The Court obviously found 
nothing unconstitutional about the challenged enactment. 
.:: 
** 
••• 
R. v. KRUG- Volume 22, page 2 of this publication . 
R. v. KIENAPPLE(1975) S.C.R. 729. 
McQUIGAN v. The Queen - Volume 25, page 5 . 
10 
In this case, Mr. Pringle was charged with: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Unlawful confinement; 
u~,c,:, firearm while committing an indictable offence (the unlawful 
co . g); 
Possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace; 
Pointing a firearm. 
The charge of the unlawful confinement resulted in an acquittal which was not 
appealed. Mr. Pringle was at trial convicted of using a firearm while committing an 
iJidictable offence, despite having been acquitted of the unlawful confinement. The 
trial judge HAD reasoned that Pringle assaulted his victim and did so with the 
firearm. The Court of Appeal had iuled that this was inappropriate and did set aside 
the conviction. Mr. Pringle had also been found guilty of the Charges mentioned in 
three and four above, but no conviction was recorded due to the Kienapple principle. 
The issues before the Supreme Court of Canada were: 
1. 
2. 
Can a person be convicted of usinJ a firearm while committing an indictable 
offence without having been convicted of that indictable offence? 
When the Court of Appeal acquitted the accused of using a firearm while 
committing an indictable offence, should it have ordered convictions to be 
registered under charge-s 3 and/or 4 above? 
The Supreme Court of Canada held that a conviction for using a firearm in the 
commission of an indictable offence cannot stand alone. Unless there is a conviction 
for that indictable offence, the accused person is presumed innocent. In relation to 
Question 2, the wording of the section, and particularly its penalty clause, indicate 
clearly that the accused was guilty of the underlying offence. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court of Canada 
* * * * * 
Dismissed the Crown's 
appeal and remitted the 
acquittals to trial court for 
convictions to be registered 
for possession of, and 
pointing, a firearm. 
11 
WHATS TIIB DIFFERENCE BE1WEEN CRIMINALNEGUGENT 
DRIVING AND PANGERQUS DRIVING? CRIMINAL INTENT 
WAITE v. The Queen• - Supreme Court of Canada 
June 8, 1989. 
Waite, having consumed seven tins of beer at a fall fair, drove down a country road 
with a can of beer in hand. He passed a convoy of four tractors and trailers loaded 
with hay. About SO people were on the wagons as part of a hayride. Some of the 
young persons involved walked on the road next to the wagons as they were switching 
from one trailer to the next. A ways up the road Waite turned around and said to his 
passengers, "Let's play chicken;" and as he drove on the left hand side of the road at 
a very high rate of-speed bearing down on the convoy, he said, ''Let's see how close 
we can get.11 While headlights were required due to the state of light, Waite drove 
with only his fog lamps illuminated At the last moment, he swung to his own side of 
the road mo~ down five hayriders who were on the roadway as described above. 
Four were killed, one escaped with injuries only. Consequently, Waite was tried for 
four counts of Criminal Negligence causing death and one count causing bodily 
harm. 
The trial jud~e told the jury that they had to view Waite's dri~ objectively to 
determine if it showed a wanton and reckless disresard for the lives and safety of 
others. He also said that they did not need to find mtention on the part of Waite to 
cause death or bodily harm to find him guilty. In other words, crimmal negligence 
requires no intent in terms of the wrongful act or in relation to the consequences. 
The driving (in this case a flagrant departure from the normal standard of driving) 
was in the absence of some explanation, conduct that is properly characterized as 
criminal ne2lilence. Differently put, the intent required for criminal negligent 
driving coufd be found in the conCluct of the accused. 
The jury asked what the difference is between Criminal Negligence and the included 
offence of dangerous driving. 
The trial ju~ge had, in response, explained that for dangerous driving, the actus reus 
(the wrongfill act) manifests itself in the driving. We are to infer from the driving 
itself, he implied, the intention to drive dangerously. 
The trial judge further instructed that for criminaJ negligence Y'?~ apply the same 
objective test as you do for dangerous driving in terms of the <1riving itself, but for the 
purpose of determining the required intent you apply a subjective test. The latter is 
to establish the mind of the accused at the time, to determine if there was "a 
deliberate and willful assumption of the risk involved in driying in the manner in 
which he was driving." In summary, the trial judge said the jury: 
• See Volume 22, page 21 of this publication for the decision by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in this case. 
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" ... you have in one, the dangerous driving, there is 
simply an objective standard, as compared to what the 
prudent driver would do. In criminal negligence, you 
have that, plus the subjective element of assumption and 
deliberate assumption of risk." 
The jury returned verdicts of dangerous driving on all counts. The Crown appealed 
this reduced verdict. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's apPeal and ordered a new trial. 
The Justices had disagreed with the trial judge that cnminaJ negligence required a 
subjective test to determine a state of mind~ to assume the risk involved in 
driving that showed a wanton and reckless disregard for others. Such a test places 
too high an onus on the Crown the Court held and considered that the mens rea 
required for criminal-negligent driving may be "objectively determined" (inferred 
from the driving) from the accused's actions. 
Waite appealed the order for a new trial to the Supreme Court of Canada, but to no 
avail. Our highest court agreed with the reasons and conclusions by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal. Criminal Negligence-may be determined objectively. 
"Criminal negligence is shown where the Crown proves 
conduct on the part of the accused which shows a 
marked and substantial departure from the standard of 
behaviour expected of a reasonably prudent person in 
the circumstances ... " 
said three of the six justices taking part in the judgment. The other three justices 
concurred in the order that the accused should be tried again but disagreed that 
criminal negligence can be determined by an objective test only. Although, they 
thought that tlie trial judge's views on the Crown having to prove deliberation and 
wilfulness was excessive, they held that there is a subjective element to criminaJ 
negligence. Said the Justice who wrote for this half of the Court: 
"! am of the view that the mental element in criminal negligence is the 
minima] intent of awareness of the prohibited risk or wilifiii blindness 
to risk." 
Crown's Appeal allowed 
Order for new trial upheld 
Note: Considering the court was split evenly on this issue, the latter view, 
be~ more favourable to an accused person, will probably be 
considered the bindin~ precedent. This also was reflected in the 
reasons for judgment m R. v. TUITON delivered simultaneously with 
those in the Waite case. 
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ROBBERY - WEAK IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENlLY BOLSTERED BY FINDING PROCEEDS 
HIDDEN BY ACCUSED 
Regina v. HARPER - B.C. Court of Appeal - Vancouver 
CA 009585 - February 1989. 
The attendant of a service station was robbed by a masked man and one other who 
was not disguised. The latter was a Native Indian wearing a red T-shirt and a blue 
pair of pants. The masked man did apparently most of the action and the attendant 
had onfy a chance to _glance twice at the Indian. Thirty minutes after the robbery, the 
attendant was taken mto a pub and asked to look around to see if he saw the man 
who robbed him. The pub can hold about 100 :persons and, at the time, there were 
only 15 patrons. The accused was the only Native Indian among the customers and 
the only person wearing a red shirt and blue pants. The attendant had said the 
accused looked familiar and identified him as the person who robbed him. 
Before being searched and booked, the accused was allowed to use a washroom 
accessible only to police personnel and staff, as it was one belonging to one 
particular cell. After using the washroom, the accused was searclied and $83.00 was 
found on his person. When another prisoner was checked into the cell with the toilet 
the accused had used, $249.00 was found hidden in the sink. This was some four 
hours after the accused was in the washroom, and no one else had used it in between. 
A sum of nearly $300.00 was taken from the attendant including a one-hundred 
dollar bill. Among the bills found hidden was such a bill. This evidence had lead to 
the accused's conviction of robbery. He appealed this conviction. 
The trial judge had held that the identification evidence by itself was insufficient to 
support a conviction. However, he found that the accused had hidden the money in 
the washroom. His not being honest about this had caused a "consciousness of guilt" 
to be deduced. The trial judge concluded that the aggregate of the evidence was 
consistent with guilt and mconsistent with any other rational conclusion. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal and held that it was 
appropriate for the judge to draw the inference that onlf the accused had reason and 
the opportunity to hide an amount of money consistent m every way with the 
proceeds of the robbery, in the washroom. That together with the identification 
evidence, was sufficient for a conviction. 
• • • • • 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld . 
~: The B.C. Court of Apr.eat held that it was not "necessary'' for the trial 
judge to "characterize' the evidence as being consciousness of guilt 
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CONSTRUCTIVE MURDER 
Regina v. STA1HAM - B.C. Court of Appeal -
CA V00526 - Victoria, B.C. - March 19gg_ 
The accused hosted others "to a long drinkin2 bout" at his home. This resulted in an 
altercation that caused Mr. Mcinnes to flee from the house. The accused and a Mr. 
B. caught up to Mcinnes and did beat him severely about the head after which they 
forced him to return to the house. The twosome then put Mcinnes in a car, shot him 
in the back, and drove him to a river where they dumped their victim in the water. 
The accused was convicted of second degree murder, after a trial with some 
technical hurdles. It was blatantly obvious that the accused and B. caused the death 
of Mcinnes, but what statutory provision rendered the accused criminally liable. The 
beating resulted in injuries that were life threatening if not medically treated; 
Mcinnes was kidnapped and this resulted in his death; the shot in the back was more 
life threatening than the beating; and, as Mcinnes died by drowning, it proved that 
he was alive when thrown in the river. 
Thejury was instructed on the definition of murder, including, of course, ca~~~ 
bodily harm and being indifferent whether it results in death or not; intentio y 
causing death of a human being; and causing death committing kidnapping while 
armed. The medical evidence showed that the injuries from the beauns were 
sufficiently severe to cause death and that the shot in the back while bemg 
kidnapped Mcinnes was even more capable of bein~ the cause of death. In the end, 
Mcinnes drowned due to be thrown in the water while he was in a comatose state. 
Having been instructed on all of the law surrounding these facts, the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty. However, it is, of course, not known which statutory provision (s. 
229 or 230 C.C.) the jury relied on. H they relied on s. 230 C.C. (causing death while 
kidnapping) then they based their verdict on law that was subsequently declared to 
be without force or effect by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
In R. v. Vaillancourt (1987)*, the accused person was a party to a robbery during 
which his accomplish shot and killed a victim of the robbery. It could not be proven 
that Vaillencourt specifically intended to cause the death of anyone, and it was only 
the construction of law that caused him to be criminally liable. Yet, Parliament 
defines murder to be an offence requiring specific intent to take someone's life. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court of Canada found that in circumstances as in 
Vaillancourt where there was no intent at all (other then to commit armed robbery) 
and where the accused had even taken precautions so no one would get hurt, the 
construction of law rather than intent or crime, could cause a person to be convicted 
of the most serious crime on our books. Consequently, "constructive murder" is 
inconsistent with the presumftion of innocence as it excuses the Crown from proving 
the most essential element o murder . . . "specific intent to take life" and is therefore 
without force or effect held the Supreme Court of Canada. 
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Since the jury in this Statham case was instructed on the armed kidnapJ?ing being 
constructive murder if death ensues, it is possible that they relied on this 
unconstitutional law to find Statham Guilty. Despite the fact that the jury could 
justifiably have relied on section 229 C.C . . .. 
The appeal was allowed and 
a new trial was ordered. 
39 C.C.C. (3d) 118 - See also Volume 30, page 1 of this publication. 
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SCHOOL TEACHER INVITING PUPILs 
TO FEUATE OR MASTURBATE lilM. 
DOES 'IHIS AMOUNT TO SEXUAL ASSAULT? 
Regina v. CADDEN - B.C. Court of Appeal -
C.A. 006595 - Vancouver, B.C. -April 1989. 
The accused was a teacher at an elemental}' school. He had placed his desk to the 
side of the classroom. Upon a nod from him, a male nine or ten-year old male pupil 
would crawl under the accused's desk and there receive instructions to either fellate 
or masturbate him. Consequently, the accused was convicted of several counts of 
sexual assault. He appealed unsuccessfully to the County Court and then took his 
plight to the B.C. Court of Appeal. He did not dispute tlie facts but argued that what 
occurred does not amount to assault, as it is defined in the criminaJ code and at 
common law. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal did firstly explore the frin~es of assault and reminded 
itself of some subtle distinctions. Assault is divided mto battery and acts or gestures 
that are threatening unwanted physical interference with the person of another. It 
also quoted: 
''To lay one's finger on another without lawful 
justification is as much a forcible injury in the eye of the 
law, and therefore a trespass, as to beat him with a 
stick." 
For example, an unwanted kiss amounts to sufficient battery to constitute an assault. 
Threatenmg behavior is also capable of amounting to assault. 
However, on the surface, the cases seemed on the side of the appellant Cadden. In 
one case, the accused was urinating in the open when four young girls (ages six to 
nine) walked by. He invited them to touch his penis and one of them did. He was 
acquitted of indecent assault as there was simplL
1
: assault. In another case, an 
accused bad invited a young boy to masturbate · As the accused had not touched 
or made threatening gestures to the boy, he had committed no assault. A father was 
home along with his 11 year old daughter. He had put his arm around her shoulder 
and led her into a bedroom where he asked her to masturbate him. His touching and 
invitation had not been of a threatening nature; and, on a subsequent occasion, when 
the girl did not wish to accompany her father into the bedroom, but nonetheless did 
not resist or object to comply with his request, it was found that what occurred did 
not amount to assault. 
Then there was a scene in a train compartment from which there was no access to 
the adjacent compartment other than via a nmning board outside the train car. 
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A woman was the lone occupant of such a compartment when the accused joined 
her. As they were on their way, the accused exposed his privates, walked up to the 
woman and invited her "to have connection with him." The same Courts that had 
found no assault in the other cases held that the circumstances in the train scene 
justified finding assault. The cramped quarters in which it happened, the assertive 
approach, and the indecent suggestion, which was beyond an mvitation, caused the 
Court to find that there was assault. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal held that the circumstances in this case were in law not 
distinct from the train compartment scene. The teacher, the appellant, had his 
victims in cramped '{uarters and did not invite them to sexually ~atify him but 
instructed them. This "constituted a threat to invade the b~ mtegrity of the 
victims." In addition, the accused's present ability to apply force caused his actions 
with his pupils to amount to assault. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Convictions upheld. 
Comment: Although one must be grateful that a teacher did not walk away 
acquitted, considering his abhorring behaviour with the students 
entrusted to him, one cannot help to have some difficulties with the 
technical aspects of this case. In terms of influence and present ability 
to enforce su~estions made to another person, it seems that the father 
home alone with his eleven-year-old daughter had exceedingly more 
such ability than the teacher with a classroom full of students at the 
scene. The comparison of the cramped quarters between the space 
under the desk and the train compartment is also somewhat puzzlins. 
The only thing the two had in common was limited space. In the tram, 
the perpetrator invades the space of the victim who 1S, by 
circumstances, confined without any opportunity to esca,Pe. To crawl 
under a desk upon a nod seemed in terms of the immediacy of the 
implied threat the Court found to be present, rather to be one 
connected with the powerful influence a teacher can have on his pupils 
then the one that is an essential element in assault. Present ability 
means that he indicated and had the opportunity to immediately carry 
out the implied threats. In that regard, ihe victims, if they wished not 
to ~atify their teacher, crawled under the desk because of the 
intimidating influence or eventual consequences should they not 
comply. Strictly from a legal point of view, in regards to assault, their 
jaunts under the teacher's desk were analogous to conscription with 
adverse consequences in case of non-compliance, but no immediate 
physical consequences. 
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MUST ONE BE TOLD TIIAT HE IS NOT 
REQUIRED TO PERFORM SOBRIETY 1EST? 
VOLUNTARINESS - DISTINCTIONS 
BE1WEEN GMNG STATEMENT LINE-UPS AND SOBRIETY TESTS. 
Regina v. HEAL - B. C. Court of Appeal 
V00754 - Victoria, B.C. -April 1989 
The accused struck two pedestrians who were on the shoulder of the road He was 
requested to perform a sobriety test after he had been made aware of his right to 
counsel and his right to remain silent. A demand was made when he failed the 
sobriety test, and the accused was consequently acquitted of "over 80 mg' and 
impaired driving. The trial judge had excluded the evidence of the test and 
evervthim? that occurred after the test He found that, in relation to the test, the 
accu5ed should have been told that he did not need to perform the test. He saw no 
distinction between statements and a sobriety test in terms of voluntariness. He held 
that a sobriety test without a warning like the one given for statements constitutes a 
Charter violation*. 'Without such a warning, a person is forced to incriminate 
himself' he had opined. 
The B. C. Court of Appeal held that should the trial judge be correct in the test being 
an infringement of a Charter ri2ht if there is no warning that the test need not to be 
done then the trial judge should also have considered if not issuing the warning is a 
reasonable limit as prescn"bed by law in a free and democratic soaety. In January of 
1989, just a few months before considering this af peal by the Crown, the B. C. Court 
of Appeal held that not making a person aware o his right to counsel prior to a 
roadSide sobriety test was such a reasonable limit*•. The Court had held that a 
roadside sobriety test is something prescribed by law despite the fact that there is no 
explicit law that provides for such a test. The Court had reasoned the absence of a 
roadside breath test in B.C. justified the sobriety test to be a substitute and an 
operational requirement to escalate suspicion into the reasonable and probable 
grounds (if any) to demand samples of breath. The criminal code provides for the 
demand ands. 214 of the B. C. Motor Vehicle Act provides for roadside driver's 
licence suspensions. Without a sobriety test police officers would be deprived of 
power necessary to enforce those laws (Interpretation Act). Consectuentlf, the test 
IS provided for by law and in view of the devastation caused by drinking drivers, the 
sobriety test without a "right to counsel" warning is a reasonable limit to the Charter 
right of the suspect. The Court reiterated its opinion, that a person is detained when 
he performs a sobriety test and warned (in Bonin) that the delay in making a person 
aware of his right to eounsel may only be brief and until the test is completed. 
However, in this case, the accused was immediately told of his Charter right to 
counsel before he did take the sobriety test. One could reason that the warning gave 
him access to counsel who, in tum, could advise the accused that he needed not to 
take the test. The Court did not go that route. It said that if not telling the accused, 
be need not take the test is an infringement of his Charter right, then tbe trial judge 
ought to have considered as they did in the Bonin case, if omitting such a warning 
was justified under section 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit. 
• 
•• 
See article in Volume 32, page 22 of this publication . 
R. v. BONIN, Volume 34, page 1 of this publication . 
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The trirn'udge had not found any distinction between giving the warning in relation 
to the ri t to remain silent and the right not to perform a sobriety test. The B. C. 
Court o Appeal obviously did and said that it could not agree with the trial judge. 
Quoted the Court*: 
"I am clearly of the opinion that the rule requiring the 
prosecution to prove that a statement of an accused was 
voluntary before it can be introduced into evidence, 
does not apply to evidence of sobriety tests of an 
accused by policemen." 
Said the Court: 
'1t is enough for this case to say that there are significant 
differences between a confesSion, "I was drunk" and the 
observation of others that when the person attempted 
the tests he was, in fact, drunk." "In my view, there are 
greater similarities between sobriety tests and lineups 
than between sobriety tests and statements." 
The Supreme Court of Canada held specifically, in January of this year, that if the 
right to counsel is complied with by police, they (police) are under no duty to inform 
suspects that they need not participate in a line-up.** The right to counsel is the 
pearly gate to such information. 
One can infer that currently the law is that a person who is tested for sobriety is 
detained; the sobriety test IS prescribed by law; not telling a person of his right to 
counsel until the test is completed is demonstrably justified m a free and democratic 
society (s. 1. Charter) and therefore a reasonable limit to the right to counsel; and 
the sobriety tests (as are the line-ups) are in terms of voluntariness distinct from 
statements made by suspects. 
Note: 
* 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
New trial ordered. 
The kernel distinction of the issues involved in the taking of a 
statement or administering a sobriety test is that, in the latter, a police 
officer observes the result of the test and can vouch for the truth of his 
testimony. Where he relates in evidence what the accused told him, he 
can only vouch for what was said but not for the truth of the content of 
the statement. Consequently, where the Crown adduces such a 
statement in evidence to prove the truth of its content, the evidence is 
hearsay. Despite this, the statement~ still be admissible provided it 
was voluntarily given. Hence, the requisite absence of hope of 
advW:!8'Je or inducement. It is reasoned that statements given where 
such · uences are present are unreliable in terms of being truthful. It 
is therefore obvious that voluntariness in relation to statements can 
hardly be compared with a person not having to perform a sobriety 
test. 
R. v. MARTIN, 131 C.C.C. 32. Alberta Court of Appeal. 
See LECLAIR and ROSS - Volume 34, page 27, of this publication. 
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BLOOD SAMPLE CERTIFICATE EVIDENCE 
Regina v. AUJLA- B. C. Court of Appeal -
C.A 009614 - April 1989 
The accused was involved in a head-on collision when he drove on the wrong side of 
the road. He sustained injuries, and while in hospital, a demand for a blood sample 
was made of him. In compliance with s. 241 (1) C.C., a medical practitioner took two 
samples of blood The accused was entitled to one of these samples upon 
application to have it analyzed for his. own purposes (s. 241 (l)(d)(i) C.C.). 
However, the section refers to the person who is so entitled as the "accused.'' 
The Crown preferred a charge of "over 80 mg11 (among others) against the accused 
nearly four months after the accident occurred. During those four months, Mr Aujla 
was not an 11accused" and not entitled to one of the samples of blood taken from him. 
When he became an accused, he was no longer entitled, as three months had elapsed 
since the sample was taken. 
The Crown attempted to prove the blood-alcohol level of the accused by means of 
the certificate provided for in s. 241. The trial judge admitted the certiticate in 
evidence, but held that the presumJ>tion that the blood-alcohol level at the time of 
driving and that, at the time of taking the blood samples was the same, was not 
available to the Crown. The availability of one of the blood samples to the 11accused11 
is a prerequisite to that statutory presumption of equalization. Consequently, the 
accused was acquitted. 
The Crown appealed the acquittal to the County Court and subsequently to the B. C. 
Court of Appeal. Both courts a~eed with the trial judge and said that if the. Crown 
wants to prosecute the accused, it should have done so by proving its case by means 
of vive voce evidence instead of having taken the certificate route. 
Crown's Appeal dismissed. 
Acquittal upheld. 
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INCLUDED OFFENCES TO SEXUAL ASSAULT USING A WEAPON -
RECENT COMPLAINT -
REASONABLE BEI .IEF OF CONSENT TO SEXUAL ACTS 
R. v. SHORT - B. C. Court of Appeal -
CA 009073-Vancouver, B.C. -May 1989 
The complainant drove the accused home after a party each happened to attend. 
They were, in the sense of relationships, strangers to one another. He invited her up 
for a coke and once in his apartment he, according to the comElainant, produced a 
knife and forced her to consent to sexual intercourse. He testified that there was no 
knife involved and that the complainant had of her own volition consented to the 
love-making. The accused was convicted of "sexual assault using a weapon" and 
appealed. 
Despite his arguments to the contrary during his trial, the appellant claimed, in his 
appeal, that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that they could return 
verdicts for the included offences of sexual assault (without using a weapon) or 
assault. At trial, the defence had argued that, in the circumstances, these offences 
were not included. The issues of consent and the knife are so intertwined that one 
could not be separated from the other. If the knife was used to obtain the conceded 
consent, then without the knife, the intercourse was consensual, and no assault of any 
kind occurred. The B. C. Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge and the 
defense position taken at trial that, under the circumstances, there are no included 
offences and that the only verdicts possible were guilty or not guilty of sexual assault 
using a weapon. 
There was another interesting issue raised in relation to the doctrine of "recent 
complaint." At one time, the Court's would seriously question the credibility of the 
victims of crime that would cause hysteria or severe indignation, if they had not 
raised a "hue and '!!1_" at the first reasonable opportunity. This defence ploy became 
a part of the Crown s armament, as statements by the Victim as to what happened 
were admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, not to prove the truth of its 
content, but to establish the credibility of the complainant's testimony. One basic 
prerequisite to admissibility was that the statement was made without probing on the 
part of the confidant. In 1983, however, Parliament enacted: (thens. 246.5 C.C.) 
'The rules relating to evidence of recent complaint in sexual 
assault cases are hereby abrogated." (Emphasis is mine.) 
In this case, the complainant had, immediately after her encounter with the accused, 
visited "confidants" during the five hours before reporting the incident to police. 
These persons testified at trial about the complainant's emotional and physical state. 
They had said she was very upset, cried and was disheveled. They had not related 
what she told them but only that she had related why she was in such a state and that 
she had told what had happened to her. In other words, the Crown used this 
evidence to show credibility on the part of the complainant without showing "prior 
consistent statements." This, the defence claimed, was using part of the abrogated 
common law principle known as "recent complaint." 
• R. v. GEORGE (1986) 23 C.C.C. (3d) 42- Volume 23, page 34 of this 
publication 
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In 1986, the B.C. Court of Appeal reviewed a similar, yet, in terms of evidence, a 
distinct case•. In that case, statements to confidants were admitted at trial despite 
the abrogation of recent complaint Held the B. C. Court of Appeal, in response to 
the defence submission that admitting the evidence of the complainant's emotional 
and physical state only (in this Short case) was applying an aspect of the abrogated 
recent complaint doctrine: 
" ... There is no evidence of what she (the complainant) said to 
these people. Therefore, this does not constitute evidence of a 
recent complaint - the sort of evidence that used to be 
permitted onlr in sexual assault cases. This is the usual 
evidence admissible in all types of cases, that the victim went to 
the police or someone and told them what they said had 
happened." 
The evidence of the confidants was consequently admissible. 
The accused also argued that the jury should have been instructed on his reasonable 
belief in the consent of the complainant. Applying a precedent established by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 1987*, the B. C. Corirt of Appeal reiterated that before 
there is an obligation to consider such belief on the part of an accused, there must be 
evidence upon which such a defence can be based There must be evidence that 
gives "an arr of reality" to such a proposition. There was nothing in the Crown's 
evidence that opened the door to such consideration and neither had the defence 
adduced anything that obligated the trial judge to instruct the jury to consider such 
belief on the part of accused. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
~: The 1983 abrogation of recent complaint only does so, in cases of 
sexual assaults. Although this common law rule of evidence, also 
applied to other criminal allegations, it has predominantly been 
applied in sex cases. It is noteworthy that Parliament seems to want to 
close the door to this rule of evidence completely if one reads section 
275 of the Criminal Code. The abrogation will apply also to incest, 
invitation to sexual touching, sexual exploitation, anal intercourse, 
bestiality, householder permitting sexual activity, corrupting children, 
indecent acts, and sexual assaults. 
• 
By specifying where the abrogation applies instead of simply 
repealing the rule altogether, one infers that the rule is still 
alive and well for other offences where indignation or hysteria 
may result on the part of the victim. Examples of those are, for 
instance, kidnappmg, unlawful confinement and like offences 
where the rule has been applied. 
R. v. ROBERTSON (1987) 33 C.C.C. (3d) 481 - Volume 27, page 27, page 14, 
of this publication. 
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TilE "DETENTION" DILEMMA 
Regina v. ELSHA W - B. C. Court of Appeal -
V167-84 - Victoria, B.C. - June 1989. 
Mr. Elshaw was seen with two yo~ boys in the bushes of a public park. He was 
overheard saying to these children, let's keep this our little secret." Police were 
alerted and arrived on the scene just after the children came out of the bushes. The 
accused was asked to identify himself and placed in the rear of the patrol wagon. 
When the accused asked why he had to sit in the car, he was told that he was under 
investigation for child molesting. The two offi.cersthen questioned the two children 
and discovered from them that Elshaw had attempted to sexually assault them. One 
officer then went to the accused and asked him what would have happened if they 
(the officers) had not arrived at the time they did. Elshaw, in response, made qwte 
an inculpatory statement about his propensity by saying: "I have these urges not so 
much with little boys, but more with little girls." He indicated that his victims were 
usually children of around five years of age and that he wanted to get help but did 
not know how to go about getting it. He was then promised that there would be an 
attempt to get him the treatment he needed. He was taken to the police station and 
was, after fifteen minutes of the their arrival there, arrested under the vagrancy 
section of the criminal code and was then for the first time told of his right to 
counsel. At his trial, his statement was admitted into evidence and he was convicted 
of two counts of attempted sexual assault. 
Since his trial, the Supreme Court of Canada defined the ~eaning of detention* and 
gave judicial guidance in relation to the exclusionary rule under s. 24(2) of the 
Charter**. There have also been a number of decisions that have clarified what it 
takes to consider right to counsel waived***. Although the trial court may have 
applied the pro.Per precedents as they then were, an appellant is entitled to have the 
pnnciples applied to his case as they are at the time of his appeal. In other words, 
the B. C. Court of Appeal had to decide on the exclusion of evidence on the basis of 
the law as it was at the time Elshaw's appeal was considered by the Court Although, 
at the time of his trial in 1984, the law, as it then was, did not render Elshaw 
detained**** while he was awaiting his lot in the rear of a police car, by the time his 
case reached the B. C. Court of Appeal, the precedents clearly detenmne those 
circumstances to create detention. The Court of ~eal held that Elshaw was 
detained as soon as he was questioned and placed m the police car. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal was very much aware of the police officers' dilemma and 
approved of them housin~Jshaw in the wagon while they discovered what took 
place. Leaving him stan in full view of the public and witnesses could have 
prejudiced the identification evidence adverse to the appellant's interest. 
* 
** 
*** 
•••• 
R. v. THBRENS [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 - Volume 21, page 1, of this publication 
R. v. COUJNS [1987] 1S.C.R.265 - Volume 27, page 1, of this publication 
R. v. CIARKSON[1986] 1S.C.R.383- Volume 24, page 38, of this 
publication 
STRACHAN v. The Queen [1988] 25 C.R. 980 - Volume 34, page 32, of this 
publication. 
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Even when the interview took place of the appellant at the scene (which resulted in 
in an inculpatory statement) the officer did not have sufficient grounds to effect an 
arrest. The B.C. Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court judge that Elshaw's 
detention, considerinf. the crrcumstances, was "reasonable and brief." Furthermore, 
the officers had been 'understandably unaware "of their obligation to make Elshaw 
aware of his right to counsel; neither had they acted flagrantly or deliberately in 
violating the appellant's rights. Also, it would be unreasonable to expect pofice 
officers m circumstances as these to not detain the suspect until discovering from 
witnesses the nature of the complaint The dilemma of the officers was then and 
would be under the present law "Akin" to that of the police officers who, during a 
search, detained someone without ~ving him the opportunity to contact counsel 
until a potentially dangerous situation was cleared up.* 
Elshaw's counsel also argued that the statement obtained from the appellant while 
he was detained contained "self-incriminating evidence" and not "real evidence." 
(see R. v. Collins above) and it should, therefore, be automatically excluded (see 
para. 3 of page 22 of Volume 34 - R. v. Simmons). The B. C. Court of Appeal held 
that the Supreme Court of Canada has not held that self-incrimina~ statements 
obtained in a manner that infringes a Charter right are automatically madmissible in 
evidence. It found support for this conclusion from the Supreme Court of Canada 
not granting leave to appeal to a Mr. Jones**. A police officer had requested Jones 
to accompany him to the police station to answer some questions about a Break and 
Enter. En route, he "volunteered" that he had been involved in the crime. After 
being informed of his right to remain silent (he was not told of his right to counsel) 
he gave a written confession. Despite this self-incriminating statement obtained in a 
manner that infringed Jones' right to counsel, the statement had been admitted in 
evidence. Despite the evidence being self-incriminating, Jones had to prove on the 
balance of probabilities that admitting the statement would bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute. Although many issues seemed to favor Jones' argument for 
exclusion (there had been no urgency; admitting the statement would effect the 
fairness of the trial) the B. C. Court of Appeal liad held that the trial Judge's 
decision to admit the ''volunteered" statement had not been unreasonable. (The 
officer had sincerely and in good faith believed that the ~t to counsel warning only 
arose upon arrest) Concluded the B.C. Court of Appeal m Jones: 
"The appellant knew as soon as he entered the police vehicle 
why he was detained and he volunteered a statement which, 
with other evidence, was sufficient to convict him." 
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court of Canada declined to hear Jones' appeal. 
It had been reasonable and necessary to place Elshaw in the police wagon and the 
conduct of the officers had not been flagrant or deliberate. Furthermore, had the 
appellant been told of his rights, he would still have responded to the officer's 
questions as he did. 
* 
** 
Appeal dismissed. 
Convictions upheld 
STRACHAN v. The Queen [1988] 25 C.R. 980 - Volume 34, page 32, of this 
publication 
R. v. JONES ( 1988) 24 B.C.LR. (2d) 180. 
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SIMII..AR FACT EVIDENCE -
SEXUAL ASSAULT 
Regina v. BROOKS - B. C. Court of Appeal -
C.A 006549 - May, 1989 
At 2:00 AM. the accused, driving his car, stowed and asked a woman for directions. 
He then jumped out of the car and forced her mto the automobile. He took her to a 
gravel pit and on the way told her he was going to have sexual intercourse with her 
and threatened her in case of obstruction. She was there forced to perform various 
sexual services to the accused. Consequently, the accused was convicted of sexual 
assault. 
Although the accused did not testify, the defence conceded the sexual activities at 
the gravel pit but claimed that it had the consent of the complainant. The Crown in 
rebuttal to the consent issue bolstered the complainant's credibility by ca11ing three 
witnesses who less than a year prior to this alleged encounter were treated very 
similarly by the accused. Among others, the similarities were the feigned need for 
direction, the threats, and the destination--the gravel pit. At the last of these 
previous sexual jaunts, the accused had been caught in the act by {>Olice. He had 
been remorseful and had admitted to be having a problem for which he claimed to 
want help. 
Defence's ground for appeal was the admissibility of the evidence of the previous 
victims and that of the police officer who related the accused's admission of having a 
problem. Consent was the single issue in the trial. "Similar fact evidence," or 
admissions on those previous occasions is not admissible to bolster the Crown's 
position that there was no consent claimed the defence. The accused took the 
position that similar fact evidence can only be used for the purpose of identity which 
was not an issue. After all, he conceded that he had the sexual experience with the 
complainant as she claimed, except that he had her consent and cooperation. 
The similar-fact-evidence rule exists at common law and has been the topic in many 
learned articles and extensive reasons for judgment Its J?~ose is fairly narrow, and 
its applications rather limited. It also has given rise to cnticism that it oversteps the 
boundaries of the principles of justice and jeopardizes the right to be presumed 
innocent. When a person has committed a certain offence in the past, his modus 
operandi may have certain features that becomes his trade mark as it were. Criminal 
activities are no exception to all other human activities; each person has his or her 
own way of doing something or approaching a certain J>roblem. Often, the doer can 
be identified by his/her methods. When the method of committing a crime has 
characteristics that are similar to those of an accused's previous proven methods, 
then the Crown may adduce evidence of such similarities to assist in proving the 
identity of the author of the crime in issue. Juries must be warned clearly that they 
may not use the evidence to establish the accused's character but only hiS mannensm 
and methods. In other words, never to conclude "he committed a like crime in the 
P.ast, and he likely did it again." The evidence of similar facts can only ~~resented 
tf it is relevant to an issue before the court. The issue of identity is the one 
claimed by defence counsel. The Crown argued that this rule of evidence has a much 
broader application. 
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Case law does show that similar fact evidence can be used for issues other than 
identity. As recently as 1987*, the Supreme Court of Canada quoted, with apparent 
approval, from cases that explored the application of this evidence rule. Quoted the 
Court: 
''Evidence of similar facts has been adduced to prove intent, to prove a 
system, to prove a plan, to show malice, to rebut the defence of 
accident or mistake, to prove identity, to rebut the defence of innocent 
association, and for other similar and related purposes. This list is not 
complete.11 (Emphasis is mine.) 
The B.C. Court of Appeal held that the evidence of the previous victims was 
properly adduced and admissible. It had shown great similarities in the accused's 
methods and that lack of consent do not deter him. That was the issue before the 
Court, and the evidence was relevant to that issue. 
In relation to the admisSI"bility of the statement by the accused on the occasion of 
one of the previous criminal events, the B.C. Court of Appeal said: 
11it constituted a tacit admission by the appellant that he had made a 
sexual attack on the 17-year-old girl. It was evidence that the jury 
could properly consider, in connection with that given by the 17-year-
old gir~ in determining whether she has been sexually molested by the 
appellant." 
It other words, it bolstered the credibility of a witness called to establish the previous 
similar fact. As such, it was admissible. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
~: The most severe criticism of this rule of evidence is that no instructions to a 
jury, regardless how eloquent, specific and appropriate in law, will adequately 
remove the danger that the lay Jury members will not be influenced by the 
bad character on the part of the accused, such evidence inevitably shows. In 
all our law, we are so careful not to reveal previous records or bad character 
to preserve total impartiality and presumption of innocence. The argument is 
that a legally trained mind may be able to draw the proper distinctions and to 
"compartmentalize" his or her mind, but that this is too much to expect from 
the lay person regardless how intelligent or well-trained (in areas other than 
law) that person may be. 
* * * * * 
* R. v. ROBERTSON - 58 C.R. (3d) 28. 
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SEARCHING PREMISES WI1H CONSENT OF OCCUPANT 
Regina v. ANDERSON - B. C. Court of Appeal -
CA 009781 - Vancouver - April, 1989 
Business premises had been broken into and tools were stolen. The vehicle the 
person used to transport the loot apparently scraped a wall. A paintchip of a unique 
color was found on the scrape-scene. The owner of the business told police that the 
accused, an ex-employer, had a van of that unique color. 
The investigating officer discussed the feasibility of obtaining a search warrant for 
the accused's premises with a superior officer. No warrant was applied for. 
The officer went to the accused's home and found the uniquely colored van backed 
into the garage and the accused doing some work inside the vehicle. The officer told 
the accused how much (or little) he had to suspect him of having committed the 
burglary. It was all done in a straight-forward conversation, and no legalities such as 
warnings of rights or reasons to search were mentioned. The accused had 
responded, "Well, go ahead Take a look. Come on in." The accused's version of the 
officer's visit was in drastic contrast with that of the officer. The accused testified 
that he refused the officer to enter, and that he had demanded to see a search 
warrant. However, nothing had dissuaded the constable from entering over his 
objections. 
The trial judge had concluded that the officer's version reflected the events as they 
truly happened. He held that there was consent (an invitation) to the search, that 
the accused had not been detained, and that there had consequently been no 
obligation to make the accused aware of his right to counsel. There simply had been 
no breach of any Charter rights the trial judge held. The accused had been convicted 
and appealed that conviction to the B.C. Court of Appeal. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal found that it had been proved on the balance of 
probabilities, that the accused gave consent to the search and that consequently 
there was no infringement of any Charter rights. 
• • • • • 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld 
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PRIVIl..EGED COMMUNICATION - PASTOR PENITENT 
CHART&"'l OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
R. v. FOSTY - Manitoba Court of Appeal 
46 c.c.c. (3d) 449 
The accused Fosty bad a girlfriend by the name of Groenke. Ms. Groenke was 
friendly with an elderly gentleman who pve her a car, travel money, an allowance of 
$250 every two weeks, and clothing. This 81-year-old man also made a last will and 
testament~ means of which he was to leave his entire estate to Groenke. Groenke 
and Fosty killed the elderly man. Groenke had planned the murder and assisted 
Fosty in the kimng of her gentleman friend. 
Ms. Groenke had had some problems in her relationship with the victim and had 
consulted on several occasions a church counsellor. Wlien the counsellor heard of 
the man's death , she phoned Groenke and inquired if she was O.K. Consequently, 
Groenke went to see the counsellor and asked how she stood with God if she had 
oommitted a murder. The counsellor and the pastor assured her of forgiveness, but 
also told her that sin had consequences. They then advised that telli!tg the truth 
would spiritually, emotionally and physically make her feel better. Not at any time 
was Groenke told to be under a doCtrinal requirement to confess or that she would 
be deprived of ai:iy church privileges if she did not confess. Neither did the doctrine 
of the denomination require confidentiality in matter like this. In any event 
Groenke told all. 
At Fosty's trial, the Crown called the counsellor and the pastor to testify. The 
defence lawyer raised a unique objection. The law of evtdence only recognizes the 
privilege of a person who communicates with his lawyer. It also renders 
communications between man and wife during their marriage privileged, as well 
communications involving state secrets. The defense argued that if the evidence of 
the counsellor and pastor was declared admissible (status quo) then that rule of law 
violates Ms. Gruenke's guaranteed freedom of religion. It would mean that if .Priest-
penitent communications are not privilized or at least confidential, then doctrinal or 
soul cleansing confessions are interfered with. Although this was not explicitly 
stated, the tenor of defence counsel's argument was that if one cannot privately and 
in confidence openly communicate with one's SP,iritual shepherd to receive assurance 
of forgiveness and peace with one's God, then, if that spiritual shepherd can be 
subpoenaed and is competent to testify as to the content of the confession, we are 
unjustifiably limited in our freedom of religion. Consequently, counsel urged that 
the Court declared the communication to be Ms. Groeri.ke's privilige and her 
confession to be inadmissible. 
The evidence before the Court did not reveal any denominational practices or 
doctrines. No evidence was adduced that the practice of confession was part of the 
denominational doctrine, or that a person subScribing to the church's theological 
theories, is deprived of any religious priviliges if there is no confession, an expression 
of repentance, and assurance of forgiveness. Consequently, there was no proof that 
compelling the counsellor and pastor to testify would limit the religious freedoms of 
the believers who accepted the doctrines of this denomination. The counsellor and 
pastor testified that it was urged of Groenke, in accordance to her religious beliefs, 
that she, for emotional comfort, spiritual well-being, and to make peace with her 
God, had to take responsibility for her criminal acts. 
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The Court also addressed the issue of general confidentiality when one 
communicates with one's pastor. Before confidential communication can receive 
any consideration for exclusion are four prerequisite conditions: 
1. The communication must have resulted from a confidence that there will not 
be any disclosure; 
2. The confidentiality must be essential to maintain a full and satisfactory 
relationship among the parties to the communication; 
3. That relationship must be one that in the general public opinion, must be 
painstakingly maintained for the benefit of the community; and 
4. The disclosure of the communication must result in greater injlll}' to that 
relationship then that resulting from the absence of a correct disposal of the 
Court case in which disclosure is sought. 
The counsellor and pastor had been no more than caritlg friends, and there was no 
"priest-perishioner" relationship per se. Although confidentiality may have been 
desirable, it was not one that in the public interest must be painstakingly maintained. 
Fosty appeal was 
dismissed. 
' L 
' i 
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PHYSICIAN GIVING DRUGS TO PATIENT FOR SEXUAL FAVORS 
ENTRAPMENT- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRIVACY ACT 
IS nm GIVING OF TWO DIFFERENT .KINDS OF NARCOTICS 
lWO ACTS OF TRAFFICKING? 
R. v. VOUTSIS - Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
47 C.C.C. (3d) 451- February, 1989 
Lynn attended the accused's medical office armed with a body pack recorder and 
transmitter. Lynn had told police how the accused, a physician, supylied her with 
drugs or narcotics in return for sexual favors. She had made her willingness to do so 
quite clear to him on a previous visit, not just by words but also deeds. 
On this occasion, she complained of back pain and the doctor administered two 
kinds of narcotics and in return received license to kiss and fondle Lynn. 
Consequently, the doctor was convicted of two counts of trafficking a narcotic. He 
appealed. 
The first ground for appeal was the admissibility of the evidence that was transmitted 
to police via the body pack If Lynn had only recorded the conversation, there would 
not have been any interception and no argument would likely arise under the Privacy 
Act. The interception was done without a judicial authorization and consequently 
the evidence was inadmissible argued defence counsel•. It was also submitted that 
the accused had been entrapped**, and that there was only~ transaction of 
administering drugs despite the fact she had been given two different kinds of 
narcotics. In other words, there was only one delict and if there ws to be any 
conviction it could be one only. 
Police learned of the accused's methods from Lynn when she was under investigation 
for offences under the Narcotic Control Act. Charges against her would be dropped 
if she cooperated with police to get evidence against the accused. She was told of the 
investigation strategy and fully understood what the intercepted communications 
between her and the accused doctor were to be used for when she signed the consent 
for such interception. Despite the trade-off in terms of the charges, the consent to 
intercept was given free of coercion, voluntary, and freely. 
The Saskatchewan Court of ~peal responded to this ground of appeal like their 
B.C. counterpart did in the Wiggins case (although they did not refer to it). There 
was no~ unconstitutional to recording the conversation and the interce.Ption had 
been done m compliance with the Privacy Act. Furthermore, the Court re1ected the 
• 
•• 
Identical argument was raised in B.C. Court of Appeal in R. v. WIGGINS, 
See Volume 30, page 17 and Volume 32, page 30 of this publication. 
See R. v. MACK+ R. v. SHOWMAN- Volume 33, page 48 of this 
Publication. 
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submission that the Privacy Act provision which allows this kind of an interception, is 
inconsistent with the Charter right to be secure against unreasonable search and 
seizure•. The Court concluded that even if the provision was unconstitutional, not 
admitting the evidence would bring disrepute on the administration of justice. The 
conversation was held to be admissible in evidence. 
The Court also found that the appealing doctor had not been entrapped. He had 
been the aggressor all throughout the encounter. He was not induced in any way. 
Police were conducting a bona fide inquiry into something that was a reaction to a 
reasonable suspicion and they had not gone beyond providing the accused with a 
reasonable opportunity to commit the crime. The defence had not rebutted any of 
these aspects of the investigation. 
The Court agreed that in these circumstances there was only one transaction, one 
administering of narcotics, despite the fact that two different types of narcotics were 
given to Lynn. Consequently, there was only one delict that could result in only one 
conviction for traffickfilg• •. 
• 
** 
Conviction on one of the 
two counts set aside. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
in regards to the other court 
of trafficking. 
This issue is under appeal in the Supreine Court of Canada (R. v. SANEILI) . 
See KIENAPPLE v. The Queen (1974) 15 C.C.C. (2d) 524. 
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THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE CHARTER 
CAN A PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR INFRINGE THE RIGHl'S OF A 
SUSPECT! 
Regina v. SHAFIE - Ontario Court of Appeal 
47 c.c.c. (3d) 27 
The accused allegedly manipulated receipts he issued on behalf of his employer and 
did thereby enrich himself. As the local police declined to investigate the alle~ed 
theft, a private investigator was engaged. The accused was taken to the investigator's 
office to be interviewed. Needless to say, the investigator (a person who, in the mind 
of the accused, could effect the path of prosecution) was a person in authority and 
voluntariness was conse~uently prerequisite to the admissibility of the admissions 
the accused made to the mvestigator. There were no problems in that re~ard, and 
the statement was held to have been given voluntarily and was admitted m evidence. 
A conviction followed and the accused appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
The defence conceded that the statement was voluntary, but argued that it should 
have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the acCUBed's right to 
counsel had been infringed. An employee superior to the acCUBed in the rank 
structure of the company, had taken him to the investigator's office. This supervisor 
had testified that if the accused had refused, he would have considered it to be an act 
of insubordination. This, the defence counsel submitted, caused detention and had 
triggered the accused's right to be made aware of his right to counsel. This had not 
been done by the supetvisor nor the investigator. The fatter had taken the aCCUBed 
into his office and had closed the door. The aggregate of this event had spelled 
detention accor~ to the aCCUBed's counsel. After all, the milieu was one of 
psychological coercton that made the accused believe that he had no choice but to 
submit to the deprivation of his h'berty." The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed and 
found that though the accused was not under arrest, he was detained. 
Then a very interesting question arose: "Does the Charter apply in a private 
investigation?" Perhaps an explanation of this question would assist in 
understanding the issue. 
Section 32 of the Charter stipulates that its provisions apply to the Federal and 
Provincial governments and their agents. Although this seems uncomplicated and 
straight forward, it is not when you apply the ancient doctrine of ''Royal Immunity." 
The 'Sovereign being accountable to the Infallible only, and never to others of the 
human race, is immune to liability if they, or agents acting on their behalf, fail to 
com.l?ly with the laws they themselves have proclaimed. Unless law specifically 
provides that it is also binding on the government, it simply is not. 
*R v. THERENS - 18 C.C.C. (3d) 481 - Volume 21, page 1 of this publication. 
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The Charter of Rights and Freedoms is part of our entrenched constitution and is 
not ordinary legislation. The main objective of the Charter is to ensure that our 
system, its authorities, the administrative processes, or the laws that inevitably 
deprive us of freedom, are not excessive. In other words, the Charter guarantees 
that those in authority over us will stay within certain boundaries. Hence, if the 
Charter, due to Royal Immunity, was not applicable to our ~overnments, it would be 
a superfluous document. Some CX{>erts reason that a provision as contained in 
section 32 of the Charter is due to its verr. constitutional nature totally unnecessary -
"Of course, it applies to the government.' However, this begs the inevitable 
question: Does it apply to the government only, or to all of us including the 
government? In other words, is section 32 there to include the government, or to 
reiterate that it exclusively applies to the government. This question, up until now, 
has not been fully answered. 
The defence counsel raised a ve1y persuasive argument. He reminded the Court that 
the employer had requested the public police service to investigate the theft. Police 
had declined to do so, and this resulted in the private investigator taking on that task. 
The results of his efforts caused the Crown to prosecute the accused. These facts 
made it blatantly obvious that, from the outset, it was the employer's intent to see the 
accused prosecuted and his investigation was not to recover his losses. He had 
therefore joined the Crown in its interest. If, in such a relationship and encounters, 
the Charter would not apply, the Crown could exploit and abuse the private sector 
for its interests. If the Court would interpret the Charter to be that limited in its 
application, then abuse and exploitation may result, which would defeat the 
pnnciples the Charter reflects. Consequently, he urged that where the Crown uses 
the furits of private encounters between people, as in this case, the person who did 
the harvesting, regardless of his position or relationship to the accused person, is, for 
Charter purposes, an agent of the Crown. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal said, "that however weakly this decision is based on 
authority," they believed it supported by principle that the Charter had no 
application in the private sector. The Court contemplated various scenarios 
involving teachers and pupils, employer and employees, or parents and children. 
Society would and could not tolerate judiciali7.ation of such relationships. For these 
reasons, the Court found that the accused had not been detained within the meaning 
of section lO(b) Charter. Consequently, the statement was not subject to exclusion 
under section 24(2) of the Charter. 
Conviction appeal was 
dismissed. 
~: There have been a few cases on this issue but none have resulted in a 
clear answer to the complexities involved. Furthermore, the courts 
have not been consistent in their opinions. One court considered that 
in the case of a citizen's arrest, the Charter did apply due to the 
authority being derived from statute. Another held that since teachers 
are employed by the State (or by a subordinate government - the 
schoolboard), the Charter applied in public schools to teacher - pupil 
relationships. A Court of Appeal was of the view that a pub owner had 
searched an underaged patron and had found marijuana on him. The 
Co~ held that i~ was unnecessary to decide if the Charter applies to 
actions of one pnvate 
,. 
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citizen to another. It held that the search had resulted from a citizen's 
arrest and was therefore a governmental function and the Charter 
applied. The search had been unreasonable and the marijuana was 
not allowed in evidence. 
H the Charter does apply to private citizens, some very_ interesting 
issues could surface. For instance, breaking in to ones house and 
ransacking the place would be the grossest example of unreasonable 
search and seizure. Wonder how the courts would react if the victim 
would petition the court for a remedy under section 24( 1) of the 
Charter. 
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WHAT HARM CAN ONE CONSENT TO IN AFIGHT? - MANS!AUGH'fER 
Regina v. JOBIDON* - Ontario Court of Appeal 
45 c.c.c. (3d) 176 
Twenty-five year old Mr. H. attended a "stag" party on the eve of his wedding day. 
While in a pub, the conversation turned to another patron of the pub (the accused) 
having "sucker punched" someone in the face. Mr. H. apparently felt obliged to 
avenge for the sucker punch and he hit the accused in the face. The proprietor broke 
up the fight, but everyone seemed to sense that this crowd pleasing, senseless, macho 
event was far from over, and indeed the spectators were treated generously. In the 
parking lot, some very angry words were exchanged and the fight (to the delight of 
the crowd) was on between the groom-to-be and the accused. De~ite the fact that 
H. was bigger than the accused, the latter got the better of H. in this short but very 
angry and vicious encounter. There is no doubt that both parties were anxious to 
participate in this fight. A blow to the head rendered H. unconscious. This 
happened while H. was still preparing for the fisdit. Despite the limpness of his 
opponent, the accused continued to punch H.'s head with the encouraging apJ>roval 
of the bloodthirsty crowd, which had angrily disapproved of those who haO tried to 
stop the encounter. H. never regained consciousness and died on what was to be his 
wedding day. 
The sole issue in this case was consent. The accused was charged with mansl&:~ter 
and the Crown had to prove that the death was caused by an W:tlawful act. In this 
case, that was assault. The trial judge found that the victim had obviously consented 
to the contest and therefore the accused had not committed an assault. Neither was 
there proof that the accused intended to cause bodily harm. The trial court 
acquitted the accused of unlawfully killing H. and thereby committing manslaughter. 
The Crown appealed. 
When reading the definition of assault, it seems to be so straight forward and simple. 
However, the matter of consent is, after all those years, still a matter of confusion 
with members of the judiciary going in various directions on their perception of what 
we can consent to, and bow far consent goes. Fightin~ for instance, is an activity not 
unlike ballroom dancin$. It requires at least two willing parties. As soon as one 
withdraws consent (in either activity) the other commits assault. In the case of a 
fight, can we say that both consenting parties are committing assaults? H this is not 
so, then how do we determine what the parties consented to: a few body punches, a 
headlock, or an all-out contest regardless of consequences? What does ilie prize 
fighter consent to when he enters the riJig or the hockey player when he goes on the 
ice? The Courts have agreed that the persons consenting to a fight can only agree to 
participate in a fair fight in "sports?" The consent does not go beyond what the rules 
of the sporting event condone. That is where consistency in judicial opinions seems 
to stop.•• 
• 
•• 
See Volume 31, page 28 . 
See Volume 21, page 23 and Volume 26, page 13 . 
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The Ontario Court of ~eal found support in the Criminal Code for that concept 
the consent has its limitations. It stipulates that one cannot consent to his death; 
prize fighting is prohibited and counselling or aiding in a suicide constitutes a crime. 
However, these statutory limitations to consent are not exhaustive. The common law 
has, for centuries, determined the breadth of consent. It basically states that 
inflicting violence, the probable consequence of which is bodily harm, is an offence 
regardless of consent. In other words, when it comes to that level of force, consent is 
immaterial. In 1882, a tribunal of 11 judges held that prizefighting was illegal, and 
that everyone involved (organizers, etc.) was guilty of assault regardless of the 
consent of the fighters. 
In 1980, the English court of Appeal was asked by reference, if in a fight to which two 
parties consent, can one who is charged with assault rely on the defence of consent. 
The Court's answer was brief and to the point. Where, in a fight bodily harm is 
intended .QI caused, the one who inflicted the harm is guilty oi assault regardless of 
consent. The common law undoubtedly limits what we can consent to. 
The trial judge in this Jobidon case had followed the Canadian straying from the 
above mentioned common law in the 1970's. Cases emer$ed where the fairness of 
the fight was the benchmark of the limit of consent. In this case too, the crowd had 
reminded those who wanted to break up the fight that it was "a fair fight." This 
spectators' opinion had influenced the accused in doing what he did in that it had 
caused him to believe that the fight was fair. Following this "fair fight doctrine," the 
trial judge had acquitted the accused. Simply put, the Crown could not prove that 
the victim had not consented to the injuries the accused inflicted on him. The 
Canadian ''fair fight doctrine" reached its peak in R. v. SETR UM* in 1976, when the 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that even in a fight where force is directly 
resulting in death, the Crown is obliged to prove lack of consent on the part of the 
victim. It became obvious, however, that the Canadian judiciary were not ready to 
accept such a liberal interpretation of the law. In subsequent cases, other Courts of 
Appeal refused to follow the SE1RUM decision and a retreat occurred from the 
four-year "go ahead and maim or kill" :precedents. In essence, these Courts have 
determined that where bodily harm is mtended OR caused consent fails as a defence 
to assault charges. The Alberta Court of Appeal seems to have had the latest words 
on this issue in two well-known cases (1987)**. Two combatants consented to a fight 
with knives. Consequently, one was stabbed. Said the Court: 
"One cannot consent to be stabbed. The public policy of 
law intervenes to nullify the apparent consent of each of 
the combatants. Each committed an assault on the 
other." 
In the second case, no weapons were involved, but bodily harm had resulted from a 
consensus fist fight. In that case, the Alberta Court of Appeal surprisingly did not go 
as far as it did in the first case. 
• 
•• 
32 c.c.c. (2d) 109 . 
R. v. CARRIERE (35 C.C.C.) 3d) 276, and 
R. v. BERGNER (36 C.C.C.) (3d) 25. 
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In this Jobidon case, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that consent is still subject to 
the limitations the common law placed on it for the protection of the person and the 
keeping of the peace. Furthermore, consent by voluntary participation in a fight is 
obtained in an atmosphere of bravado in response to insult or challenge; often in the 
absence of sobriety or ability to consider consequences. To believe, as our Courts 
appear to have done for a sliort period of time, that the Parliament through the 
Criminal Code, gave licence to brawling, maiming, and even killing as long as there 
was this so-called consent, is to reduce our society to one who adopts the law of the 
jungle. We must continue to assume that our society intends to be civilized. 
The accused intended to cause bodily harm and in carrying out that intent, he caused 
death. In these circumstances, the Crown needs not prove that there was no consent 
on the part of the victims. 
Applying the common law, the Ontario Court of Appeal, in essence, said that where 
in a consensus fight bodily harm is intended or caused the issue of consent is 
irrelevant as we cannot, in law, consent to injury being inflicted in a contest. 
Consequently, there was assault, an unlawful act by means of which the victim's life 
was taken. 
* * * * * 
Crown's appeal allowed. 
Acquittal set aside. 
Conviction of manslaughter 
entered. 
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IS SEEING, BELIEVING? 
ADMISSIBU .JTY OF CERTIFICATE OF ANALYSIS 
Regina v. PLAMONDON - County Court of Kootenay 
C.C. 130683 - Cranbrook, B.C - January, 1989 
The officer who demanded breath samples of the accused, testified how he had 
turned him over to the breathalyzer teChnician, who, in turn, gave the officer a 
certificate of analysis which was served on the accused. The technician did not 
testify, and the arresting officer did not say he saw the accused give samples of 
breath. 
The trial judge had not allowed the certificate in evidence as the Crown had not 
established a nexus between the accused and the eerson named in the certificate.* 
Due to a lack of evidence independent of the certificate, the certificate was ruled 
inadmissible and the accused was acquitted. The Crown appealed 
It seems that there was an unawareness of the decision by the B.C. Court of Appeal 
in October of 1985**. The majority of the Court had held that the certificate IS 
evidence that two samples of breath were analyzed. Should such evidence be 
prerequisite to the admiwbility of the certificate, its content may be regarded. The 
Court of Appeal had concluded that insisting on evidence independent from the 
certificate to accept that two breath samples were taken would defect Parliament's 
intent. The le~tion was, after all, designed to make it unnecessary to call the 
technician. Smd the Court: 
"H the taking of samples had to be proved by oral 
evidence, that could only be the evtdence of the 
technician." 
The B.C. Court reasoned that the link that needs to be proved is that the 
breathalyzer tests the certificate refers to are made as a result of the demand made 
by the arresting officer. In the Schlegel case, as in this Plamondon case, the arresting 
officer testified that the person from whom the demand was made was turned over to 
the technician for the purpose of administering the tests and certifying the results. 
In this case, the Crown had proven the link as described above, and there was no 
need for evidence extraneous to the certificate that samples of breath were taken. 
• 
•• 
. . . *. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered and 
acquittal set aside . 
R. v. VAN DER SCHOOT- County Court of Vancouver - C.C. 841733 
R. v. HRUBY - 4 M. V.R. 192. Alberta Court of Appeal. 
R. v. SClH...BGBL (1985) 22 C.C.C. (3d) 436, also Volume 22, Page 5 of this 
publication. 
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MISSPEWNG NAME OF ACCUSED ON 
CERTIFICATE OF ANALYSIS-ADMISSIBIUTY - EVIDENTIARY YALW 
Regina v. VAN EGMOND - County Court of Vancouver 
No. CC 881302 -April, 1989. 
The Crown proved by means of a certificate by a qualified breathalyzer technician 
that ''Taylor Ashley Van Egmond's" blood/alcohol level was above the legal limit. 
Consequent!~, 'Taylor Ashley Van-Egmond" (minus a hyPhen in his surname) was 
convicted of 'over .08%." Van Egmond appealed claimmg that the certificate had 
been wrongfully admitted at his trial as it referred to another person. 
The Crown took the position that the hyphen was not a letter and therefore there 
was no misspelling. In other words, the name with the hyphen was the same as the 
one without. The County Court Judge hearing the appeal held that adding a h_yphen 
to a name changes the nature of the name, consequently adding or omitting a hyphen 
is a misspelling. 
In relation to the certificate of analysis, the County Court Judge reminded himself of 
the views expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1977. • The statutory 
provisions for the certificate are a short-cut for the Crown and deprive an accused 
person of normal rights to cross-examine. Therefore, the certificate must be in~ 
compliance with those provisions to be admissible. Any ambiguity or other 
shortcoming must be interpreted in favor of the accused. 
The Court found that the certificate in this case was completely in compliance with 
the law and was therefore admissible but that its evidentiary value needed to be 
examined. Was it capable of proving that Van Egmond had a blood alcohol level 
Van-Egmond was certified to have at the time of the offence? Is the Crown allowed 
by means of testimony to correct the defects in an otherwise admissible certificate? 
H so, had the Crown corrected the defect in this case? 
The "conditions precedent" for a certificate to be admissible are summed up ins. 
258( 1) C.C. H the certificate is defect on account of one of these conditions, then the 
defect cannot be corrected. As a matter of fact, there is nothing to correct as the 
certificate is inadmissible. H the certificate is admissible and there is a defect other 
than in relation to a "condition precedent," then the Crown may correct the defect. 
This was done in a near identical case where it was certified that "Hanz Wright" had 
a certain blood-alcohol level while a "Hazen Wright11 was on trial. In that case, the 
technician had been the arresting officer and he testified that the accused and the 
person the certificate referred to were one and the same. The B. C. Supreme 
Court,• upon Wright's appeal, held that the Crown had corrected the admissible but 
defect certificate. 
• 
•• 
R. v. NOBLE(1911) 37 C.C.C. (2d) 193 . 
R. v. WRIGHT(1981) 11M.V.R.217 
40 
In this Van Egmond case, the technician did not testify. As a general rule, no one 
other than the person who certified something can remedy an admiSSJ'ble but defect 
certificate. However, the cases on this J?Oint are all in relation to professional people 
who, upon examinations and tests, certified a professional opinion. A breathalyzer 
technician only reads from a dial scientific data and certifies what they indicated. 
In this case, the arresting officer testified that he turned Van Egmond over to the 
technician, was present when he gave samples of his breath and observed the 
readings obtained. The Van-Egmond certificate was referring to Van Egmond, the 
accused. The Crown had therefore remedied the defect. 
• • • • • 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld . 
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ACCEPTINGREFUSALATTHESCENE -
W AS OFFICER GIVING LEGAL ADVICE 
WHEN HE RESPONDED 1HAT HIS DEMAND WAS LEGAL? 
Regina v. EMMIE KING HONG LEUNG - County Court of Vancouver -
c.c. 881772 -April 1989. 
Very close to the police station, the accused was stopped for crossing a divider line 
several times. The officer, who stopped her, gave all the appropriate warnings and 
made her aware of her right to counsel. Her response to, "Do you understand?" was 
the familiar gesture across the lips simulating the doing up of a zipper. When asked 
to accompany the officer, she said each time, "No, no, no, no, you are unreasonable. 
I'll walk.' She al!!io asked over and over again if the demand made of her was legal. 
The officer each time said it was. Finally, the officer accepted her refusal at the 
scene which resulted in a conviction for refusing to accompany and supply breath 
samples. The accused appealed. 
Defence counsel submitted that the appellant had asked the officer for a legal 
opinion which he had not hesitated to give. He should have referred her to a lawyer 
and provided her with time to do so, despite the fact that the appellant had not once 
asked to consult counsel. Counsel felt that her very question, "Is your demand 
legal?" is the equivalent of asking for legal counsel. 
The Appeal Court Judge found that the failure to consult counsel was a direct result 
of the appellant's unreasonable attitude and nothing the officer did had caused that 
failure or the unreasonableness. She had not requested counsel and the officer had 
not rendered legal advice or opinions. He simply meant he was serious about the 
demand he effected 
• • • • • 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
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CREATING A DISTIJRBANCE 
OPPOSING INTERPRETATIONS OF lllE IAW- B.C. PRECEDENT 
RAKIC and the Queen - County Court of Vancouver 
C.C. 881859 June 1989 
There are in essence two interpretations of the offence of causing a disturbance in or 
near a public place. The origiilal, or "orthodox," judicial views of this Criminal Code 
offence was that if one by the means listed in the well-known section interrupted the 
peace and tranq_uility of the community, the offence was complete. Then there 
developed judictal views that the disturbance must be more than one which causes 
the emotional upset of a community member (excluding peace officers) or interrupts 
tranquility. The disturbance created must liken in terms of sufficiency (the breach of 
peace aimed to be prevented) to an affray, riot or unlawful assembly. In other 
words, whatever the disturber did in or near a public place must be as traumatic to 
the disturbed number(s) of the public as an affray riot or unlawful assembl~. It 
seems that the Courts with their contem1,>orary interpretation, have added 'a 
secondary activity'' to the orthodox definition of a public disturbance with (in terms 
of severity) an included gauge. 
IN 1982* a Mr. Peters appealed his conviction of creating a disturbance to the B.C. 
Court of Appeal. He urged the Court to adopt the new judicial perception of the 
offence. Instead, the Court reconciled the cases on this issue. Peters was at the 
scene of some ocCurrence police attempted to control. He and his buddy were told 
to leave and to go in a certain direction. While saying (shouting): "res, sir, fucking 
pig sir ... "he went in the opposite direction. New orders only received the same 
reaction and obscene response. There was no evidence that anyone other that the 
officers heard or were offended by the profanities. As a matter of fact, the officers in 
their testimony did not say anything about their own emotions when they became the 
target of Peters' excessive language. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal described the orthodox approach to the interpretation of 
the offence: 
"All that the section requires is that one of the specified acts, 
i.e., fi.Jditing, screaming, etc., be done in circumstances where it 
disturoed a person or persons, or where such disturbance might 
reasonably be inferred" 
The new judicial perception is: 
• 
"That it is necessary that the specified acts, i.e. fighting, 
screaming, etc., must cause a secondary activity and that such 
secondary activity itself must be in the nature of a disturbance;" 
R. v. PETERS(1982) 2. W.W.R. 520- Volume 5 page 19 of this publication. 
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The B.C. Court of Appeal held (in 1982) that the correct interpretation lies 
somewhere in between these two opposing views. Mere shouting at police officers 
and hurling obscenities their way IS by itself incapable of causing a Oisturbance, and 
Peters' conviction was set aside. 
The reactions to or results of the specified acts~ cause a secondary situation 
which by itself is a disturbance-needless to say then the persons who committed the 
S{>ecified act( s) created that disturbance. H the result of the specified act( s) is that a 
atizen was disturbed as intended by the enactment then also, the offence is 
complete. The kernel aspect of the offence is the interruption of the public peace 
and tranquility to which every community and citizen is entitled and lias a right. 
Mr. Rakic was stopped for a traffic violation. When approached by one of the two 
officers and asked for his driver's licence, he went literally off the deep end. He was 
hostile and aw.essive while the officer wrote out the traffic ticket. Rakic screamed 
and yelled while standing near the police car and made obscene gestures. The 
description of the accused's behaviour was vivid and would give anyone cause to 
doubt his sanity. He also turned in the same hostile demeanor (all verbal) to people 
nearby. The evidence left no doubt that people in a nearby buildin~ were awakened 
by the accused's performance. His utterances included threats against the officers. 
When the officers, in the hope that matters would return to normal if they left the 
scene, tried to drive off, Raldc jumped in front of the police car. The driver drove 
around him. When he was abreast of Rakic, he loudly and hysterically screamed 
claiming the police cruiser struck him. 
Peters claimed that he had not caused a secondary activity which was of itself a 
disturbance. Following the binding Peters decision, the County Court judge found 
that the trial judge had not erred when he held that the offence was complete when 
Rakic, by his conduct, had "affected" one or more persons. His disorderfy conduct 
had interrupted the peace and tranquiHty of the community. Either situation 
justifies a conviction. The fact that his conduct did not create a secondary activity 
that by itself amounted to a disturbance, did not preclude a conviction. 
Accused's appeal dismissed . 
• • • • • 
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DOES OMISSION OF ADDUCING EVIDENCE OF 
PREREQUISITE KNOWLEDGE MAKE THE DETENTION 
CAUSED BY THE DEMAND ONE OF AN ARBITRARY NATURE? 
REGINA v. TOWNSEND - County Court of Vancouver 
Prior to the Charter coming into effect, a Mr. Rilling was tried and convicted of a drinking/ driving offence. The grounds of his appeals to superior courts were in 
relation to the officer's reasonable and probable grounds upon which the demand for 
breath samples was made. From his case arose the binding precedent that once 
someone does give samples of his breath upon demand, the reasonable and probable 
grounds prerequisite to making it are irrelevant. 
In this case, Mr. Townsend was convicted of "over 80 ml" and he appealed to the 
County Court. Although the officers did have reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe the accused was impaired and had been driving, the eVIdence simply did not 
include anythln,g to show that the driving had taken place within two preceding hours 
from the time the demand was made. The demand had resulted from the officer 
attending a two car accident in which Townsend was involved. The only evidence of 
the time of driving, was from the other driver in the accident, which indicated that 
the demand was made 30 minutes after the accident occurred. However, the officer 
must believe the driving occurred within the preceding two hours arid there was no 
evidence of such belief. Hence, there was no evidence before the Court the 
demanding officer had belief of the prerequisite grounds that the law stipulates, 
argued the defence. The Crown on the other hand, reminded the Court of the 
binding Rilling decision. Townsend did give samples of his breath and therefore, the 
lack of grounds which the demand must be made is irrelevant. 
The County Court judge held that the Rilling decision is still the law, except where 
there is an infringement of a Charter of right involved. In this case, the defence 
argued that a demand causes detention, and without prerequisite grounds, detention 
is arbitrary and contrary to section 9 of the Charter. Although Charter violations 
must be proved by the person who alleges it (in this case, Mr. Townsend), the 
Criminal Code provisions for breath demands seem to indicate that grounds for such 
a demand must be proved by the Crown. Where the Crown's evidence shows there 
was detention, then lack of proof of the grounds required to involve such detention 
lead to an inference that the detention was arbitrary. 
Having concluded that the essential breath analysis evidence had been obtained in a 
manner that infringed Townsend's rights, the Court had to decide if admitting the 
evidence could bring disrepute on the Administration of Justice. In view of the 
evidence of the other driver that the accused drove a half hour before the demand 
was made of him (which did not assist the Crown in showing the officer knew this), 
made the infringement a technical one. Consequently, no disrepute would result. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
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Comment: One cannot but be curious how this case would fare in further appeals 
to courts of superior jurisdictions. The precedents show (seemingly 
except in an assertion of unreasonable search and seizure) that the 
burden of proof is on the accused to show, on the balance of 
probabilities, that his rights were infringed before a remedy or 
exclusion of evidence under section 24 of the Charter can be 
considered. The pasition can be taken that the defense proved 
nothing. There simply was an oversi~t on the part of the Crown to 
establiSh that the officer knew the driving had taken place within two 
hours when he made the demand. This omission was seen as the 
defence having met its burden of proof for consideration for exclusion 
of the certificate evidence. In view of the other driver's evidence, it 
seems probable that the officer knew. However, that does not satisfy 
the burden on the Crown to show the prerequisite to the demand, 
neither does the omission referred to above seem able to show that the 
detention that the demand constituted was arbitrary. The proof that 
the officer knew was at best, on the balance of probabilities, a far cry 
from it being beyond a reasonable doubt. The proof on the part of the 
accused, that the officer did not know, was at best on the balance of 
possibilities, a far cry from the balance of probabilities. It seems that 
the admissibility of the certificate was a simple matter of the Crown 
perhaps not having proved one element requisite to this statutory 
evidentiary short cut, rather than it being worthy of the constitutional 
trip the defence lured the Court to take. In any event, it appears 
challengable if the defence had made out a case of arbitrary detention. 
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An explosive storage magazine had been broken into and a quantity of explosives 
and detonating devices had been stolen. Tire tracks were found outside the building. 
Nearly two years later, the accused's property and house trailer were searched. The 
tires on his car matched those found on the scene. Buried under his trailer, police 
found explosives and devices of the same brand and quantity as what was taken 
durill2 the break-ins. Some notes were also found. These outlined a plan to commit 
a rob6ery of a large scale which would include the use of explosives. 
The accused was convicted of the break and enter and possession of explosives with 
intent to cause serious harm. He appealed this conviction, claiming tluit the Crown 
had failed with its circumstantial evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt what 
had been alleged 
The tires on the accused's car were three of one kind, and one different tire. 
Considering the nearly two years that had passed from the crime to the time of the 
search and arrest, anyone could have changed a tire. Therefore, the identical 
configuration of tires on his car as the one used in the crime was sheer coincidence 
or accidental. Furthermore, if it was indeed his car that was used in the crime, the 
Crown failed to prove he (the accused) drove it. 
He also argued that the explosives were not found in the trailer, but outside of it. 
Anyone coilld have buried them there. For him to have possession, the Crown must 
prove that he had knowledge of the presence of the explosives. It had failed to do so, 
claimed the accused. 
The appellant also argued that the three notes outlining the wicked plot to commit 
robbery, had been found in his trailer among hundreds of papers. The Crown had 
failed to prove that he was the author of these notes or that he even was aware of 
them. 
The appellant had failed to testify at his trial. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge was entitled to draw the 
inferences of possession and knowledge from all the evidence (the aggregate of it) 
and to find it consistent with the conclusion that the accused had committed the 
break and enter and had possession of the explosives for the purposes outlined in the 
notes - and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion. 
The Court of Appeal declared, despite the expiration of nearly two years, that the 
possession in these circumstances was recent. This triggered the well known rule of 
evidence that in the absence of an explanation capable of belief, it ma)'. be found that 
the possessor had the knowledge re9uisite to criminal possession or did commit the 
crime by which the goods were obtamed. The appellant had not explained at the 
time he was found to have possession of the explosives, nor did he do so during his 
trial. Reiterating their opinion on this, as expressed in an earlier decision, the Court 
said: 
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... "there was evidence of a direct nature which inculpated him 
and which the jury accepted as truthful, then this Court may 
well consider his failure to testify as a factor in disposing of this 
appeal." 
The inferences of ~t that were drawn from all of the evidence was something the 
trial court was entitled to do. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Convictions upheld. 
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REFUSAL - RIGHT TO COUNSEL- OBLIGATIONS ON POLICE 
TO ENSURE TIIAT RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS NOT INFRINGEJ) 
R. v. EV ANS - County Court of Vancouver 
c.c. 880465 -April 1989 
The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal of refusing to comply with a demand to 
provide samples of his breath. Close to midnight, the accused was given access to a 
telephone to contact a lawyer. After 11 minutes, including police assistance in 
dialing, the accused made police aware that he would not give any sample of his 
breath. Police, knowing that the accu8ed had been unsuccessful in his attempts to 
contact counsel, accepted his refusal and charged him accordingly. According to the 
trial court, police bad not fulfilled their obligation in regards to the accused's ri$ht to 
counsel despite the Charter warning and assistance. He was consequently acqwtted. 
The Crown argued before the County Court that the accused received a reasonable 
opportunity to contact counsel and had voluntarily, after 11 minutes, abandoned any 
ftiither attempts to exercise his right. There was no further obligation on police 
regarding that right in these circumstances, submitted the Crown. 
The County Court Judge included in his reasons for judgment the complete text of 
his brother, Judge Leggatt's summary of the principles which govern police practices 
following detention, as the result of a demand:• 
• 
1. 
2. 
3. 
A person detained by police in order to provide a 
sample of his breath must be given "a reasonable 
opportunity to retain and instruct counsel." What is 
"reasonable" will depend upon the facts of each case. 
The police cannot establish arbitrary time limits in 
which detainees are expected to retain and instruct 
counsel. A detainee is not automatically entitled to two 
full hours in which to make this consultation. 
The police may, without violating the detainee's right to 
counsel, demand that a detainee provide a breath 
sample, and expect compliance even though there has 
been no consultation with counsel when: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
The situation is urgent (in this case, when the two 
hour time limit is about to expire). 
The police know, or have reasonable grounds to 
believe, that the detainee has actually, retained 
and instructed counsel, or 
The detainee has clearly and unequivocally waived 
this right to counsel. 
R. v. McLEAN - County Court of Vancouver -
No. C.C. 870298-November 10, 1988 
4. 
5. 
6. 
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The police cannot demand that a detainee provide a 
breath sample when he is in the course of actually 
retaining and instructing counsel 
H the police know that a detainee is awaiting a call from 
a lawyer they cannot require him to comply with a 
demand. There is an obligation upon police to discern 
how long the detainee is going to have to wait for this 
call. 
A detainee must diligently pursue his right to counsel. H 
he does not, the police can le~timately demand that he 
provide a breath sample. This may violate the 
oetainee's right to counsel, but any evidence collected in 
this manner will be admissible in court, as it's admission 
does not bring the 'administration of justice into 
disrepute.' 
a) 
b) 
a person remainidffi silent and refusins to use a 
telephone is not ·gently pursuing his rights, 
if a .Person is silent after having used a phone, the 
police have an obligation to diScem whether he 
has spoken with counsel. H he is awaiting a call 
from a lawyer, the police cannot interrupt. H he 
refuses to answer, or has retained counsel they can 
demand a breath sample. 
7. While a detainee does not have an absolute right to 
retain counsel of his choice, when acting in good faith he 
must be given every opportunity to seek the instruction 
of his own lawyer. 
In the course of his review of the authorities, Judge Le~att 
dealt with situation in which the accused is silent Iollowmg a 
telephone call. He said at p. 16: 
Of a somewhat different nature yet, is the case where a 
detainee apparently finishes using the telephone, but is 
silent as to what has occurred. The police may be left 
wondering whether he has completed consulting with a 
lawyer, in which case a valid demand can be made, or 
whether he is in the process of retaining and instructing 
counsel, and an "interruption" would result in a Charter 
breach. 
In such a case, I am of the opinion that the police have 
an obligation to ask the detainee what has occurred. 
Such a duty is similar to the one imposed by the court in 
Elefante [~ Elefante (1986) 47 Alta. LR. 139 (CA)]. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF TRAFFIC REFEREES 
OFFICER-WITNESS-PROSECUTOR ROLE-
APPARENT BIAS 
RANDAIL /Jr. The Queen - County Court of Vancouver -
CC 881138 - May, 1989 
Ms. R. felt harassed and unfairly treated when she appeared before a Justice of the 
Peace to dispute the Traffic Violation Report issued to her. The police officer who 
issued the ticket was also the witness and prosecutor during the proceedings. She 
reasoned that a prosecutor has a semi-judicial role that excludes the notion of 
winning or losing. He ought to be an agent of the Crown who is a party to the quasi 
criminal dispute. With the officer being a witness and the prosecutor, it cannot but 
leave the im;Pression of prejudice on the part of a party who should be impartial. 
The officer issued the ticket and he wants to prove that he was correct and therefore 
desires to win. This, at least, is the inevitable inference the lay person (and even the 
experts) will draw. Needless to say, that this flies in the face of the dictum that 
justice must not only be done but must also seen to be done. The lower the court, 
the more important this appearance of justice is. Furthermore, the officer may be a 
prosecutor but is for numerous reasons not an agent of the Crown. 
Ms. R. appealed the finding that the violation occurred on the grounds that the 
procedures were an infringement of s. 7 and s. 11 of the Charter. The former assures 
the right to life, liberty and.security of the person while the latter guarantees us to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty by an independent and impartial tribunal. 
A traffic violation is, in terms of these Charter provisions, the equivalence of an 
offence due to there being consequences when it is found that the violation occurred 
though they are not the traditional fines and default sentences. The County Court 
Jud~e held therefore that the procee~s with the witness-prosecutor violated 
particularly s. 11 of the Charter as that gives rise to an operative bias. 
The constitution, however, does not exist in a vacuum and practical matters may well 
justify the limits a law or procedur!fllace of our guaranteed freedoms (s. 1 of the 
Charter). Due to the volume of tr c tickets (70% of all those issued) are heard in 
these traffic courts. Furthermore, the discretion is retained by Crown counsel if a 
traffic allegation will be heard with a Crown representative present. This balances 
the effect of the current system and "the apparent bias in the objective of processing 
a high volume of routine traffic tickets in an informal, inexpensive and largely fair 
and efficient manner." 
Despite the proceedings being inconsistent with the Charter provisions, the 
constitutional violation is saved by s. 1 as a reasonable limit prescribed by law. 
Appeal dismissed 
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CAN A DRIVER DELEGATE HIS OBLlGATIONS 
UNDER TIIE "IIlT AND RUN" LAWS TO AN01HER PERSON? 
Regina v. MORYS-EDGE - County Court of Vancouver 
C.C. 890100 - August 1989. 
The accused who conceded to be under the influence of alcohol at the time, collided 
with a number of unoccupied parked cars. He stopped, gave his wallet to one of his 
passengers and instructed her to identify him as the driver of the offending car. He 
left his driver's licence and all necessary documents with his delegate. Leaving his 
car at the scene, the accused walked away not wanting to face the possible 
consequences of his condition. Despite the fact that by delegation and personally, he 
had met all his obligations, he was convicted of criminal "Hit and Run." He appealed 
on the ground that it was proper and lawful to fulfill his duties under the hit and run 
laws by delegation. 
No precedent could be found among Canadian cases to resolve this issue. However, 
the Road Traffic Act of E~land contains hit and run laws similar to those in our 
criminal code. In one English case, an employer instructed an employee to stay on 
the scene of an accident with the company vehicle that had been involved, so he 
could go back to his office approximately a block away from the location of the 
mishap.• The Queen's Bench upheld the employer's conviction of hit and run. 
Allowmg a driver to delegate his obligations opens the door to him escaping liability 
for, for instance, ~~ent to drive. It would simply render the legislation 
ineffective in some · g it is designed to capture and include. 
H delegating a driver's personal obligation at an accident would be permitted, he 
could escape criminal liability if his ability was impaired by alcohol, probably the 
very cause of the accident. 
LEE v. KNAPP[1961] 3 ALL E.R. 961 (Q.B.D.) 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
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''WHO, FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE PROWUNG IA WS, 
IS THE PERSON ON WHOSE PROPERTY THE TRESPASS OCCURS?" 
Regina v. CROWE - County Court of Vancouver -
c.c. 890326 - July 1989. 
The accused had been convicted of "prowling upon the property of 5th Avenue 
Apartments Limited." The section defining the offence stipulates that the prowling 
must have been done "on the property of another person ... " He appealed the 
conviction on the ground that there was inadequate proof of ownership and that the 
Crown failed to prove that he did not own the building. 
The County Court Judge went further than the accused did in his aJ?peal. He 
reasoned that the offence of prowling is a trespass of which the victim is not the 
owner of the property but the person the sanctity of whose home was violated. It is 
law that prOVIdes protection for the people who live on the property and does not 
protect some commercial interest. The word property means more than a chunk of 
real estate, if this law is to meet its objective. For the purpose of the prowling 
section," the property of another person" does not refer to ownership but to tlie 
residential users of the property. The owner, a corporate structure, leased out the 
residential use of the building and has limited access to the dwellings contained 
therein. Not likely did the corporate structure "5th Avenue Apartments Limited" 
live in the building. Hence, it had no right in relation to the sanctity of the home, to 
declare trespass under the prow~ section. Such declaration is not needed but the 
Crown must show who the person 1s that could. This failure and the 5th Avenue 
Apartment Limited obviously for the purpose of s. 177 C.C. not being the other 
person on whose pro{>erty the ap1_>ellant prowled, caused the appeal court to allow 
the appeal and set aside the coDVIction. 
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TRAFFICKING OR A "RIP OFF?" 
Regina v KEILTY - County Court of Vancouver 
June 1989 
"Any smoke?" asked the undercover officer of the accused. They made a deal, $35 
for three (3) grams of weed The officer was asked to go to a certain place and wait 
there. The accused joined him shortly after, over a cup of coffee. The accused told 
the officer that he had been warned that he, the officer, was a policeman. The 
officer assured the accused he was a construction worker. The accused then told the 
officer to wait, while he went away with 35 of the officer's dollars in his pocket. He 
said he would be back shortly with the weed The officer's last words to him were: 
"Don't rip me off'' to which the accused replied: "Just keep my coffee warm." 
The last request was a near impossibility as the accused failed to return. Despite the 
absence of any "weed," the accused was charged with trafficking in marijuana. 
The accused testified that there was no marijuana and that he had been desperate 
for money. 
"I thought, well maybe this guy will give me 
money and let me out of his sight, so I just played 
it out." 
In other words, he claimed that the encounter was a "rip off'' and that he therefore 
was not guilty of trafficking. 
The Crown relied on the definition of trafficking under the Narcotics Control Act 
which includes the offering to sell a narcotic. The accused, of course, did make such 
an offer. 
The defence argued that the accused could not have had the intent to traffic as be 
simply did not have the contraband. H making an offer to sell a drug does not 
require the mental element of intent, then the offence of trafficking is one of 
absolute liability. The evil intended to be cauJdit by the trafficking laws is the 
possession, sale or other distributive means of narcotics and not the act of deception 
that the accused committed. Hence the offer to sell must be one made with the 
intent to traffic and does not include offers made in jest or, in this case, to deceive. 
In 1978, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Regina. v. the City of Sault Ste. Marie, 
defined "absolute liability." An offence of absolute liability is one where the Crown 
must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused committed the offence 
without having to prove any relevant mental element. The defences of due diligence 
or mistake of fact are not available in absolute liability offences. A person can be 
convicted of such an offence even if he is morally innocent or without fault. 
Absolute liability offences are usually failures to comply with regulatory laws where 
we, for the sake of public health or safety, cannot afford the usual defences (hygiene 
standards in kitchens of restaurants; undersize wildlife or fish etc.) .. 
Furthermore, the defence argued that section 7 of the Charter requires that intent is 
an essential element of trafficking. It is an offence that carries a maximum penalty 
of life imprisonment and it can hardly have been the intent of Parliament that 
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punishment of that severity be imposed for an absolute liability offence. If so, it 
Should be declared to be without any force or effect for its inconsistency with the 
principles of fundamental justice. (It should be remembered that our narcotic and 
<Jrua laws are regulatory in nature and were not enacted as "criminal law" as.agned to 
the l"ederal government by the distribution of power provision in our constitution). 
The County Court trial judge held that the sections of the Narcotics Control Act are 
sufficiently broad to include in trafficking not only the hmm~ offers to sell, but 
also the fraudulent ones. Trafficking includes deceptive offers by means of which a 
person attempts to profit, said the court: 
f'J conclude that the~ ra of the offence of 
offeri!Jg reflects the nature of the crime and 
therefore satisfies the principles of fundamental 
justice." 
Finally, the defence argued that not the accused, but the officer had made an offer to 
which the accused had simply respc>nded. The Court rejected this submission. The 
response by the accused was the offer. He had immediately asked the officer: "How 
much" to establish the quantity required That amounted to an offer to get the 
officer what he wanted. 
Accused convicted of 
trafficking. 
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WHEN IS A TRAFFIC CONJRQL DEVICE TO BE OBEYED 
Regina v. BRA YBROOK- County Court of Yale 
C.C. 34465 - Kamloops, B.C. - June 1989 
On our highways in B.C., the sign "Check Brakes" is common at the approaches to a 
steel' dec1Ine. In this case, the sign said ''Trucks over 5500 kg Licensed Gross 
Vehicle Weight Check Brakes - exit 500 m." The driver of a large transport truck 
ignored the sign and was convicted of disobeying a traffic control device. He 
appealed his conviction. 
The sign was no doubt a traffic control device, but was it of the kind we have to obey 
or was it one that simply recommends something. Section 23 of the Motor Vehicle 
Act Regulations does clearly indicate that those devices are subdivided into those 
two categories. For instance, on the approaches to curves, there are signs that 
indicate speeds below the speed limit of the road. These signs are warning signs that 
recommend a safe speed. Non-conformance does not constitute an offence. 
Section 130 of the Motor Vehicle Act (which supersedes the Regulations) clearly 
makes no distinction between traffic control devices that are adVisory and those that 
must be obeyed. It simply says that unless otherwise directed by a peace officer, we 
must obey the instructions of a traffic control device. We must assume that this 
offence section refers to the signs that are identified as regulatory rather than 
advisory in the Regulations. All regulatory signs are depicted in the Regulations and 
the sign the accused disobeyed is not included. Consequently, the sign was advisory 
only, unless the instructions on the sign "are clear, unambiguous and obviously 
mandatory." As these were not the case, no offence was committed. 
Crown's appeal 
dismissed. 
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CARE AND CONTROL OF A "STUCK" MOTOR VEHICLE 
R. v. WEISZBECK - County Court of Yale - Kamloops 
C.C. 32589 - March 1989. 
The accused was found in an impaired condition in the early morning hours behind 
the wheel of his four-wheel drive motor vehicle which was stuck in a ditch alons the 
highway. The engine of the pick-up truck was running when the police found him. 
At his trial for having care and control while impaired, the accused testified how he 
had demonstrated the truck to a friend. When 1t got stuck in the ditch they walked to 
the friend's house where he got drunk. He walked back to his vehicle and sat in it 
waiting for the morning when he would get towed. As it was cold, he started the 
engine to have the benefit of the heater. He said, he knew that the truck could not 
be moved and therefore had no intentions of even trying to set it into motion. The 
trial judge made no decision on whether the vehicle was immobile, as this, in his 
view, was immaterial. Based on a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
1982*, a person can be guilty of care and control, even when the vehicle is immobile. 
As long as the person had access to and used the fittings and equipment of the 
vehicle, care and control is complete. 
This left the County Court Judge, who heard the accused's appeal from his 
conviction of having the care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired, to 
assume that the accused's version of the events were accurate and that the truck was 
stuck. A relevant case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1985* * (not 
referred to by the trial judge) was applied by this appeal court. In R. v. Toews**, the 
Supreme Court of Canada modified and clarified their Ford decision. It felt that 
"care and contra~ short of driving, are acts which involve some use of the car or its 
fittings and equipment, or some course of conduct associated with the vehicle which 
would involve a risk of ~tting the vehicle in motion so that it would become 
dangerous." Then, our 'ghest Court warned that each case will vary from others and 
need to be decided on its own merits. 
The County Court Judge concluded that "the possibility of creating danger is a 
material aspect in a charge of care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired." 
Knowing that the vehicle was immobile (something the Court had to accept due to 
the absence of a decision by the trial judge) the accused could not create a danger in 
doin~ what he did. This meant that the accused (appellant) did not have the 
reqwsite intent to be convicted as he was. 
* 
** 
FORD v. The Queen - 65 C.C.C. (2d) 392. Also, Volume 5, page 23 of this 
publication. 
R. v. TOEWS (1985) 47 C.R. (3d) 213. Also Volume 22, page 24 of this 
publication. 
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The appeal court allowed the appeal but held that it could not make a final 
disposition, as it had not been determined if the trial judge believed the accused and 
whether the vehicle was really stuck. Accordingly, 
Conviction set aside. 
New trial ordered. 
Note: In 1967, the Supreme Court of Canada decided on appeal by the 
Crown that a person can be in care and control of a motor vehicle even 
though it is immobile.* However, that case in terms of intent is 
distinct from this Weiszbeck case. Saunders had no idea the vehicle 
was inoperable and was apparently in an impaired condition 
attempting to make it mobile m: simply took care and control being 
unaware or indifferent to the state of mobility. Concluded the County 
Court Judge in this Weiszbeck case: 
* 
'"Thus a person could be guilty if he has care and 
control of a vehicle and does not know that it is 
inoperable." 
The only distinction then is the mental element. The wrongful act 
(actus reus) is the same, but the intent (mens rea) is lacking where 
there is knowledge that the vehicle is immobile. 
* * * * * 
R. v. SAUNDERS [1967] 3 C.C.C. 278. 
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VALIDITY OF DRIVER'S LICENCE SUSPENSION 
WHERE SUSPECT IS REFUSED AN ANALYSIS OF ms BREATH 
Regina v. JEWER - County Court of Westminster -
19543 - Chilliwack B.C., June 1989 
A police officer suspended J ewer's driver's licence under section 214( 6) of the B.C. 
Motor Vehicle Act. Jewer immediately requested a test to determine his blood-
alcohol level. The officer refused this request as he felt that the suspect would not 
exceed 80 mg. and that no criminal charge would result. 
Jewer drove after the suspension was imposed, and was convicted accordingly. 
The applicable section of the Motor Vehicle Act stipulates that where a driver, who 
is requested to surrender his driver's licence, forthwith requests a peace officer to 
administer and does undergo as soon as practicable a test that indicates that his 
blood alcohol level does not exceed 50 mg. of alcohol in 100 ml of blood, the 
prohibition is terminated. 
Upon appeal, the County Court found that the officer's belief that the accused would 
blow less than 80 mg was totally irrelevant. The Court held that the wording of the 
section clearly indicates that where a suspended person requests a test to determine 
his blood alcohol level, there is an obligation on the part of the peace officer not to 
unreasonably refuse such a request. 
In these circumstances, the appellant could not stand convicted of driving while 
under suspension. 
Conviction quashed. 
Acquittal entered. 
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LEGAL TIDBITS 
COPYING VIDEO TAPES - FRAUD 
The accused stacked the shelves of his video rental store with videos he had 
duplicated. Some of the original tapes had been rented for this purpose from other 
video rental places. Police searched his store and received the accused's full 
cooperation m identifying the pirated tapes. Some 140 of these were seized and the 
accused was charged with "Fraud" under the criminaJ code. He argued that he 
should have been charged under the copyright Act or should have been sued should 
the State or anyone want to pursue his action. Furthermore, he argued that as he 
bad only copied and not deprived the others of property his actions did not amount 
to fraud. The County Court of Westminster (the trial court) held that the CopYright 
Act is not the only act applicable. Furthermore, it held that Fraud does not anse 
only where there is actual economic loss but also where there is a risk of such loss. 
By copying the tapes contrary to law, he had reduced the market for those who 
lawfully produce, sell and distribute such tapes at an economic advantage. 
Accordingly, the accused was convicted. 
The County Court of New Westminster - X018847. January, 1989. 
• • • • • 
SEATBELTS ARE UNCONS1ITUTIONAL (IN Al .BERTA) 
Mr. Maier was charges with not wearing his seatbelt. He adduced evidence at his 
trial that injuries are caused by seatbelts whether properly worn or not. Although 
the rate of mjuries caused by seatbelts is low, there is nonetheless a risk of injury 
when wearing one. Taking his conviction to the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench, the 
appellant argued that the seatbelt law infringed his right to the security of his person 
as guaranteed bys. 7 of the Charter. This Court found that no person in the pursuit 
of a lawful activtty (driving) can be subjected to a penal sanction for refusal to 
comply with legislation regulating that activity, when doing so would render him at 
risk of injury. The Crown not havi~ advanced evidence to show that the seatbelt 
law was a reasonable limit of the right to the security of the person, the Court had no 
choice but to declare that law without force or effect. 
R. v. MAIER - Alberta Court of Queen's Bench - 47 C.C.C. (3d) 214. 
• • • • • 
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ONUS OF PERSON ACCUSED OF A RESTRICl'ED WEAPONS OFFENCE 
THAT HE WAS THE HOLDER OF A REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE 
The accused was convicted of having a .44 magnum revolver in his possession, 
without having a registration certificate issued to him for that restricted weapon. 
Due to section 115 C.C., the accused and not the Crown had the onus to prove that 
there was an appropriate document that authorized him to possess the weapon. The 
accused argued before the Supreme Court of Canada that section 115 C.C. offended 
the Charter, depriving him of his right to be presumed innocent, including his right to 
remain silent This Court held that the section does no more than compelling a 
person to produce a certificate, which, by virtue of the Interpretation Act, is proof of 
its content. Consequentl_Y., the production of such a certificate favours the accused. 
The production of a certificate or licence is the reasonable obligation of the holder 
or possessor. The section does not force the accused person into the witness stand as 
the _presence of a certificate would forestall criminal proceedings. The disputed 
section was not considered to be unconstitutional. 
SCHWAR1Z v. The Queen - 45 C.C.C. (3d) 97. 
* • * >l< • 
. WHATCOURTHASJURISDICTIONOVERANADULTPERSON 
CHARGEDWITHFAII.lNGTOCOMPLYWITHA YOUTHCOURT-
DISPOSIDON 
By disposition of a Youth Court judge, the accused was to report to a youth worker. 
He did so until he was 18 years old, and then stopped, despite the fact that the time 
period for reporting extended beyond his 18th birthday. He was consequently 
charged in open Court for the summary conviction offence under the Young 
Offenders Act, for failing to comply with the disposition. The argument was that the 
Provincial Court bad no Jurisdiction over the matter, as he should have been tried in 
Youth Court. Despite the provision under the Young Offenders Act that a person 
continues to be a minor with respect to proceedings of an offence he committed 
while he was still under the age of 18 years, if he commits an offence in relation to 
the proceedings when he is 18 years or older, then the Provincial Court has 
jurisdiction over that offence and the accused, held the B.C. Court of Appeal. 
R. B. M. and the Queen - 46 C.C.C. (3d) 315. 
• • • • * 
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POSSESSION OF A DEVICE FOR OBTAINING TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
WITIIOUT PAYMENT OF LAWFUL CHARGES 
The accused was found in possession of nine Zenith decoders which were modified 
to receive the pay T.V. signals of a cable company without the Eayment of the lawful 
fee. On the surface, such possession is contrary to s. 327 C.C. (89 Code). The 
section stipulates that for the possession to be culpable, it must be in circumstances 
that "give rise to a reasonable inference that the device has been used or was 
intended to be used" to obtain the use of the T. V. cable service without pay (as it 
happened to be in this case). The accused, who had modified the decoders, mtended 
to sell them. He argued that the section did not apply to his situation. He bad no 
idea what people would do with the gadget despite the f~ct that such interception 
was the only use they had after modification. He himself had no intention of using 
them. The trail judge held that it is only an offence if the person is in possession for 
the purpose of his/lier own use of the decoder. The Ontario Court of Appeal 
disagreed and held that the section was sufficiently broad to capture the accused in 
the circumstances in which he had possession of the decoders. 
R. v. FUWP- 46 C.C.C. (3d) 427. 
• •••• 
AGENT PROVOCATION AND ADMISSIBILITY OF 
STATEMENTS MAPE TO SUCH AGENT 
The accused was in custody awaiting trial for very serious crimes. He was reported 
to be boasting about his past criminaJ accomplishments and the future of his criminaJ 
career. Two undercover officers who were instructed not to initiate conversations or 
ask leading q.uestions, were put as qents provocateur in cells with the accused. He 
made many mcriminating statements to them and even tried to recruit them for 
joining his g~. The admissibility of these statements was strenuously opposed as 
the accused's nght to counsel and the principle's of fundamental justice were 
infringed. The Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that all statements were admissible 
and that the right to counsel or the nght to remain silent had no application here. 
Neither were any fundamental principles of justice offended. 
R. v. WGAN - 46 C.C.C. (3d) 354. 
• • • • • 
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AllEGED POllCE BRUTAllTY USED AS A DEFENCE FOR REFUSAL 
The accused was observed driving erratically. A constable stopped him and 
demanded a "roadside breath sample." He said: "You got me. rm impaired. I'm 
not going to take the test." He then made a number of obviously fake attempts to 
blow. Without arresting him, the officer charged the accused wtth refusal and she 
told him of his right to counsel The car (van) was towed away and the officer asked 
where the accused wanted to be dropped off. He refused to go home and said that as 
the van was his home, he was her problem. As she did not want to leave him 
stranded in the snowstormy weather, the officer took the accused to the police 
station where an all out effort was made to find someone who would accommodate 
the accused After a scuffle, the accused was placed in a police car and droJ>Ped off 
at his girlfriend's place. The accused described the scuftle as a severe beating and 
the officers testified hov1 they had used reasonable force to remove a very hostile 
man from the office and supplied him with transportation. When home, the accused 
had himself transported by ambulance to the hospital where they could not fin~ any 
reason for the accused's "severe neck pains." As a defence to the charges of refusal 
and impaired driving,the accused raised that his Charter rights to security of his 
person, not to be arbitrarily detained and not be subjected to unusual or cruel 
treatment, were infringed. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal responded to the 
accused's appealing his conviction of refusing to blow: 
"The incident ... (scuffiejbeating) ... took place an 
hour and a half after the original detention and had no 
bearing on the charge." 
In addition, the Court found the police had made every effort to accommodate the 
accused, except give him back hiS van. One and one half hours were spent, and he 
was not to be apeaced Police had been more than reasonable, and in any event, it 
had no bearing on the refusal that had happened a couple of hours before to the 
"scuffle." 
R. v. DAVIDSON - 46 C.C.C. {3d) 403. 
• • • • • 
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CONSTITUTIONAUTY OF PRESUMPTION 1HAT A PERSON WHO 
ENTERS A BUILDING WITIIOUT IA WFUL EXCUSE DOES SO TO 
COMMIT AN INDICTABLE OFFENCE 
A shift worker who was asleep and home alone in the middle of the afternoon, was 
awakened by someone calling from downstairs: "Hello." The man got up and met 
the accused near the top of the stairway wearing rubber gloves. The accused 
immediately turned around and went back downstairs wliere he told the occupant of 
the house that he was stuck down the road and needed a tow. Then, the accused's 
son, who was sitting in the accused's car in the driveway, came inside and said there 
was an injured dog down the road and that they thou2ht that the dog possibly 
belonged at the house that was entered. The son of the accused and the son of the 
occupant of the house had been friends. While this conversation was ongoing, the 
son of the occupant arrived home. He had_ not seen any cars stuck or an mjured dog. 
The trial judge bad no doubt that the accused intended to commit an indictable 
offence in the house. Using the wellknown presumption that a person who, without 
lawful excuse, enters a building, intends to commit an indictable offence therein, 
convicted the accused (he had not believed the accused's testimony). The accused 
appealed, challenging that the presumption infringes his right to be presumed 
innocent until the Crown proves his intent to commit an indictable offence in that 
house. Because the essence of the law providing protection for our most private 
places and considering the high incidence of break and enter offences, the 
presumption provision in the Criminal Code was found to be demonstrably justified 
m a free and democratic society. The "evidentiary assist" the presumption provides is 
to control the commission of offences that are not trivial but are to be categorized as 
pressing and substantial, concluded the Ontario Court of Appeal. The appeal was 
dismissed. 
R. v. NAGY - 45 C.C.C. (3d) 350. 
~: The Ontario Court of Appeal held that this familiar Criminal Code provision 
placed an evidential burden on the accused to raise a reasonable doubt to the 
existence of the presumed essential fact. The presumed fact was that he intended to 
commit an indictable offence in the house upon proof that he had entered without 
lawful excuse. However, the proven fact (that he entered without lawful excuse) 
does not lead "inexorabJY' to the conclusion that the fact to be presumed (that he 
entered with the requisite intent to commit an indictable offence) exists. The 
Supreme Court of Canada held in 1988* that statutory (or common law) provisions 
which, upon proof of a substitute fact, allow an essential fact to be presumed, do 
violate the presumption of innocence, unless the former leads to an inexorable 
conclusion (beyond a reasonable doubt) of the existence of the latter. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal held that being unlawfully in a dwelling does not lead to the 
inexorable conclusion of the essential element of the break and enter offence, that 
the house was entered with the intent to commit an indictable offence. 
• R. v. WHY'IB - 42 C.C.C. (3d) 97 . 
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Consequently, the provision is inconsistent with the Charter right of being 
presuniedinnocent until proven ~ty beyond a reasonable doubt After applying 
the "section 111 test to this provision, the Court declined to declare the section without 
force or effect. In this test, two things are considered: 1. the importance of the 
unconstitutional provision to warrant overriding a constitutional protection, and 2. 
the balance between the interest of society and the individuals or group (the latter is 
also known as proportionality test). 
1. 
2. 
Provisions which ensure objectives that are "trivial or discordant" with the 
constitutional right they offend cannot withstand the test; .awl 
Provisions that offend the Charter must be rationally connected to their 
objectives to survive a "section 1 n test. 
Considering the gravity and high incidence of breaking and entering, the "intent" 
presumption does not have a trivial objective. The fact to be proven is rationally 
connected with the fact that may be presumed. 
* * • * * 
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DEFAULT SENTENCES 
SPEOAL CONSIDERATION FOR AGE GROUP IS UNCONSTITIJTIONAL 
The Criminal Code of Canada provides that no person between the ages of 16 and 21 
shall be committed to jail for the non-payment of a fine unless the Court has 
received and considered a report of 11the conduct and means to pay'' of that eerson. 
Ms Hebb was fined $500 or 30 days in default for the theft of a package of cigarettes. 
She failed to pay the fine and a warrant of committed upon conviction was issued by 
the Court. Ms Hebb is 35 years of ~e, on social assistance and a soup kitchen 
regular. She has a history of mental illness, is illiterate and is not employable. she 
applied for the Nova Scotia Supreme Court to quash the warrant for committed as a 
remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter. She had no choice but to default. If she had 
been 15 years younger, then the special consideration afforded that age group would 
probably keep her out of jail. Consequently, she claimed that the law discriminates , 
contrary to her right under s. 15 of the Charter. Everyone should be entitled to the 
special consideration granted to the young only. No person ought to serve a jail 
sentence for the inability to pay a fine. The Court therefore declared the words 
restricting this special sentence consideration to those between the ages of 16 and 21 
years to be without any force or fault. As the Court had not given Ms Hebb special 
consideration, the warrant for her committal was quashed. 
Regina v. HEBB - 47 C.C.C. (3d). 
Nova Scotia Supreme Court, February 1989. 
• • • • • 
THE WHQLE TRUTII AND NOTIUNG BUT'fHE TRUTH 
Judge questioning a six-year-old girl to determine if she should be allowed to testify: 
The Court: Do you know what is meant by telling the truth? 
Child: Yes. 
The Court: What happens when you don't tell the truth? 
Child: God will get upset. 
The Court: That's a good answer. Do you like school? 
Child: Yes. 
The Court: What is your favourite subject? 
Child: Recess. 
The Court: Consistent with my views when I was your age! 
Regina v. D. (RR)- 4 C.C.C. (3d) 97. 
66 
RQADSJDE SOBRIETY TEST 
In November 1987, the B.C. Court of Appeal decided that a roadside sobriety test 
constitutes detention. A party by the name of Bonogofski* was acquitted as he had 
not been told of bis right to counsel before he was subjected to such a test. All 
evidence had been excluded. This case did not seem to saturate the police 
community so lllit.DX prosecutions failed and continued to fail after very short trials. 
In J~ 1989, the B.C. Court of Ai>?'al considered the case of The Queen v. 
BONIN* which was indistinguishable for Bonogofski It held that the test does 
constitute detention, but that "briefly delaying the Charter warning until the test is 
completed is justified under s. 1 of the Charter. This has now caused appeals from 
pre-Bonogofsld cases (most post-Bonogofski cased did not make it past the trial 
stage) to 6e abandoned. Assuming, uyon non-appearance of counsel for the 
appeflants, that the Bonin case had disposed of tile matter, the County Court of 
Westminster dismissed three appeals. 
• 
•• 
R. v. Bonogofski- Volume 29, Page 1 of this publication. 
R. v. Bonmn- Volume 34, Page 1 of this publication. 
R. v. JACOBSEN X018758 - R. v. Malloney X018897 and 
R. v. Wlll1E X018662 - (New Westminster Registry) June 1989 . 
• • • • • 
MUST "REFUSING" PARTY BE TOLD? 
The accused was caught up with at his home after a display of abnormal driving. A 
demand for breath samples was made to which the response was an unhesitating: "I 
refuse." The accused then gave the officers the name of his lawyer and told them to 
contact him. He appealed bis conviction for refusing to blow claiming that when he 
refused, he should liave been told again of his right to counsel and the fact that 
refusing amounted to an offense. The County COurt of Vancouver held that the 
demand caused detention but the appellant had been ~rly told of his rights. 
When he refused and the officer acknowledged the re the accused coufd not 
possibly have felt detained although he may have expected an arrest for refusing. 
However, the officer simply issued an appearance notice for "refusing" in lieu of 
arrest. There was no need to tell the accused of the posstole consequences of 
refusing in these circumstances, although it may be advisable practice. The 
appearance notice was sufficient notice of the offence and there had been no need to 
tell the accused a~ain of bis Charter riah.ts as there simply was no longer detention 
and no new situation of detention hadooen created. 
Conviction upheld 
Regina v. JONES - County Court of Vancouver - C.C. 880044 - June, 1989 . 
• • • • • 
67 
IDT AND RUN - INTENT TO ESCAPE LIABIUTY 
VALIDITY OF PRESUMPTION OF INTENT 
Mr. Gosselin struck two pedestrians with his car. One was thrown for quite some 
distance and was found dead on the side of the country road where the accident 
occurred. Gosselin stopped some distance from the scene and saw other motorists 
assist the one victim. A few minutes later he called the police to report the accident 
but failed to identify himself and did not say he was the driver. A good hour later, he 
again phoned police and gave his name and address and disclosed he was the driver 
responsible for the accident The accused testified that he had asked the surviving 
victim if he wanted an ambulance and police. Upon an affirmative answer, the 
accused had gone to a restaurant from where he bad made two calls. Appealing his 
conviction for hit and run, the accused argued that the Crown bad failed to prove 
that he had not fulfilled his obligations under the Criminal Code. Should the Crown 
rely on the statutory presumption that failing to stop and assist is, in the absence of 
any evidence to the contrary, proof of intent to escape civil or criminal liability. The 
accused argued that the presumption was unconstitutional as it offends the 
presumption of innocence. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the phone calls 
and remaining at the restaurant are facts capable of amounting to evidence to the 
contrary that he intended to escape liability. The Court also found that the 
presumption contested by the accused was a reasonable limit of the presumption of 
mnocence (s. 1 Charter). 
R. v. GOSSBUN - 45 C.C.C. (3d) 568. 
Appeal allowed - new trial 
ordered. 
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